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DICKENS REDUX: H .O
ERICAN CHILD LABOR LA
BECA
ACONGA
SEYMOUR MOSKOWITZ*
ABSTRACT

Millions of American teens are employed today in a variety of
workplaces., The jobs they hold typically provide little human capital
for their future economic self·sufficiency, and pose substantial
immediate and long-term safety, academic, and behavioral risks for
this generation-. This Article seeks to answer the question of how
American law and society reached this situation, which has such
disastrous effects for working youth, their families, and society as a
whole. Three main themes are developed:
1. Child labor has always been part of the American economy,
from colonial times until today. While there have been more than 150
years of effort to curtail youth employment, this movement has been
generally unsuccessful at both federal and state levels.

2. The federal .courts, and particularly the United States Supreme
Court, defeated repeated statutory attempts to restrict child labor. This
judicial activism is demonstrated by the previously untold factual and

*Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. Parts of this Article were
originally presented at the Annual Colloquium on Current Developments in Labor and
Employment Law and at several Work-in-Progress sessions. I thank the many
colleagues who provided critiques and suggestions for further research, and Professors
Ivan Bodensteiner and RosaJie Levinson for insightful comments. Invaluable research
assistance was provided by Abby Rom and Nathan Vis, both Valparaiso University
School of Law, 2010. As always, my colleague Melissa Mundt contributed
indispensible support.
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legal history of several cases, especially the famous decision in
Hammer v. Dagenhart.
3. With Locknerismfinally demolished by the Great Depression of
the 1930s, the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was to
be the death knell for child labor. This victory was, in fact, pyrrhic.
The weaknesses of the FLSA resulted in the continuation of youth
employment. These statutory deficiencies were the outcome of a toxic
combination of factors: profits from cheap labor, entrenched and
powerful economic interests, and racism.
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I.INTRODUCTION

Charles Dickens' fictional portrayal of nineteenth century English
child labor was based largely on his own youthful factory experience
1
while his father sat in debtor's prison. The vivid descriptions of

1.
When his father was sent to Pauper's Prison Charles Dickens was forced to
work in a shoe blacking factory, where his peers calJed him "scholar." Dickens later
described himself in David Copperfield: "a child of exceJient abilities and with strong
power of observation, quick, eager, delicate and soon hurt bodily, or mentally."
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abandonment and exploitation in Oliver Twist, David Copperfield, and
other novels were powerful protests against a system that robbed youth
of childhood and long-term life prospects for employer profit. While
Parliament ultimately passed statutes ostensibly safeguarding child
workers, these laws provided only limited protection and were rarely
2
3
enforced. On this side of the Atlantic, children have been an integral
part of the labor market from the founding of the American colonies to
our contemporary globalized economy.
In the United States, after an extraordinary campaign spanning
more than half a century, Congress enacted national legislation on child
4
labor. Since the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in
1938, public policy on child labor has changed little. The federal
statute and similar state laws barred children under eighteen from
mining and manufacturing worksites producing goods in interstate
5
6
commerce.
The FLSA also proscribed "oppressive child labor."

Charles Dickens, David Copperfield Vol. I in The Works of Charles Dickens 184
(Charles Scribner's Sons 1899). His personal experience was mirrored in almost all his
works together with the images of the conditions he saw while forced to work to
support his family. Robert Langton, The Childhood and Youth of Charles Dickens 7280 (The Author at Albert Chambers 1891 ).
2. The most important Factory Acts regulating the hours of labor for both adults
and children were passed in 1833, 1844, and 1847. See generally John Ward, The
Factory Movement: 1830-1855 (1962). Ward traces early efforts in England for reform
of labor within factories. Labor advocates at this time noted sixteen-hour workdays of
children working in ninety-degree factories, youth who uwere industry cripples treated
worse than dogs." /d. at 56. Three decades of advocacy ended with a sixty-hour
workweek, which was rarely enforced. /d. at 346.
3. The U.S. common law recognizes legal adulthood as beginning at age
eighteen or upon emancipation, marriage, or with parental consent. Douglas Abrams &
Sarah Ramsey, Children & The Law 811 (3d ed., West 2007).
4. The term "child labor" is used here to describe paid employment by persons
under eighteen years of age. "Youth workers" and other terms are used throughout this
Article synonymously.
5.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 C.F.R. § 570.2(a)(i) (20 10); 29 C.F.R.
§ 570.2(a)(ii) (20 10); 29 U.S.C. § 203(1) (20 10).
6. Children under age eighteen are barred from working in jobs administratively
defined to be "particularly hazardous ... or detrimental to their health or well-being."
29 U.S.C. § 212(c) (20 I0). Even this limited protection is conditioned by specific
exemptions for occupations other than manufacturing and mining, for example,
agriculture. If the occupation has been declared hazardous by the Secretary of Labor,
eighteen is the minimum age to work in that job. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.120 (20 I0).
Those designations have remained unchanged since 1975. 29 C.F.R. § 570.67 (20 I0).
See infra notes 328-340 and accompanying text.
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Aside from those limits, adolescents over sixteen have no restriction on
7
time or place of their work. Fourteen- to sixteen-year olds have some
8
limited time restrictions, but are free to work in most worksites.
9
Today, the FLSA and equivalent state 1egislation are assumed to
protect American youth workers from exploitation in the workplace.
When Americans are at all cognizant of issues of child labor, the image
is that of exploited children in Third World countries. Yet this
soothing picture masks a very different reality. Despite the best efforts
of American reformers for over 100 years, restrictions on child labor
have remained more symbolic than real. Although some of the worst
abuses of the nineteenth century have been abolished, at least five
10
million American adolescents are at work after schoo1; hundreds of
11
thousands toil in agriculture.
The United States has the highest
percentage of working children of any developed nation.
7. Schmidt v. Reich, 835 F. Supp. 435, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
8. Fourteen- to sixteen-year-olds may not work more than eighteen hours per
week during the school year, nor after 7:00 p.m. on a school night. 29 C.P.R.
§ 570.35(a) (20 10).
9. The FLSA explicitly does not pre-empt state child labor laws. 29 U.S.C.
§ 218 (2010).
10. Millions of youths under eighteen are in the contemporary American
workforce but the precise number remains elusive. The Child Labor Coalition (CLC)
estimates 5.5 million youth age twelve to seventeen are in the workforce. Child Labor
Coalition, Youth Employment Statistics, http://www.stopchildlabor.org/USchildlabor/
statistics.htm (accessed Jan. 25, 2011 ). Approximately 70--80% of youth work in paid
jobs at some point while attending high school. Alexis M. He11nan, U.S. Dept. of Lab.,
Report on the Youth Labor Force 75, http://stats.bls.gov/opub/rylf/pdf/rylf2000.pdf
(revised Nov. 2000).
11. Estimates concerning the number and makeup of child fannworkers vary
widely. See Celeste Corlett, Impact of the 2000 Child Labor Treaty on U.S. Child
Laborers, 19 Ariz. J. Inti. & Comp. L. 713, 713 (2002) (estimating 800,000 to 1.5
million children age five to fifteen toil in harsh conditions in the U.S. agriculture
In 1998, the General Accounting Office (now the Government
industry).
Accountability Office (GAO)) estimated that 300,000 youth aged fifteen to seventeen
were working in agriculture. The U.S. Department of Agricu)ture's National
Agricultural Statistics Services (NASS) stated that 431,730 youth between the ages of
twelve and seventeen were hired for agricultural work in 1998. Association of Farm
Workers Opportunity Programs, Children in the Fields: An American Problem 6,
http://afop.org/download/ II/ (2007). See Child Labor Coalition, Children in the Fields
Campaign Fact Sheet, http :1/www. stopchi ldl abor. org/Consumercampaigns/fi e1 ds. htm
(2007) (estimating over 400,000 children between ages twelve to seventeen work in
agriculture). Hospital emergency room and workers compensation data suggests that
youth injuries in agriculture are more severe than those at other worksites. Child Labor
Coalition, supra n. I0.

2010]

AMERICAN CHILD LABOR LAW BECAME A CON GAME

93

Approximately 80-90% of youth work in paid jobs at some point while
12
Once having begun paid employment they
attending high schooJ.
usually continue to work with increasing frequency and intensity.
Restrictions on the number of hours and the type of work they do are
13
minimal
and penalties for violation of child labor laws are
14
extraordinarily lax.
This employment presents potential benefits for the adolescent,
including income, valuable lessons about responsibility and finances,
and transferrable job skills. However, children's work in the United
States most especially "high intensity" work, i.e., more than twenty
15
poses substantial immediate and long-term
hours per week
academic, safety and health risks for youth workers. These adolescents
16
have less academic success in high school
and increased
absence/drop-out rates than those who do not work or work fewer
17
They are also more likely to use cigarettes and other harmful
hours.
12. Herman, supra n. 10, at 75. Over half the youths interviewed by the DOL
responded that they had held jobs at the age of fourteen; over 60o/o worked at age
fifteen. /d. at 14-15. See also Ellen Greenberger & Laurence D. Steinberg, When
Teenagers Work: The Psychological and Social Costs of Teenage Employment I 1
(Basic Books J986).
13. While the child labor provisions of the FLSA provide some limits, a tangle of
exemptions guarantees both complexity and non-coverage of many youth workers.
Although the Act prohibits adolescents from working in hazardous occupations,
adolescents over sixteen years of age have no federal restrictions on the number of
hours or the time of day they may work. See Schmidt, 835 F. Supp. at 444.
Additionally, the FLSA does not apply to youth employed in activities in an
"enterprise" with less than $500,000 per year in operations, 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(s)(l )(A)(ii) (2009), or not affecting interstate commerce, although those workers
may be protected by state statute.
14.
Civil penalties of $1,000 per violation were first added in 1974 because the
injunctive and criminal sanctions were detennined to be "insufficiently flexible." Fair
Labor Standards Act § l6(e), Pub. L. No. 93-259 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
216(e). See also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.~ 446 U.S. 238,244 (1980).
15.
Natl. Research Council Inst. Med., Protecting Youth at Work 3-4 (Natl. Acad.
Press 1998).
For example, students working longer hours have lower grade point averages.
16.
See e.g., R. D' Amico, Does Employment During High School Impair Academic
Progress? 57 Soc. Educ. 152, 152-64 ( 1984); Herbert W. Marsh & Sabrina Kleitman,
Consequences of E1nployment During High School: Character Building, Subversion of
Academic Goals, or a Threshold? 42 Am. Educ. Res. J. 331, 33 l-369 (2005).
17.
See generally Rhoda V. Carr, James D. Wright & Charles J. Brody, Effects of
High School Work Experience a Decade Later: Evidence From the National
Longitudinal Study, 69 Soc. Educ. 66, 66-81 ( 1996); see generally Sharon Wofford
Mihalic & Delbert S. Elliott, Short- and Long-Term Consequences of Adolescent Work,

94

WHITTIER JOURNAL OF CHILD AND FAMILY ADVOCACY [Vol. 10:1

substances, have more traffic accidents and teen prefnancies, and to
1
experience a wide variety of other negative outcomes.
The physical hazards of youth work have always been enormous;
they_ re~ain so today. T~e numbers of children killed and injured on
1
Today
the JOb tn the early twentieth century was well-documented.
the workplace is the fourth most common cause of harm to A.m erican
2
Fatalities of working youth are far too
youths aged ten to nineteen.
21
common.
Work-related injury rates for contemporary juvenile

°

28 Youth & Socy. 464, 464-489 ( 1997); Jeylan T. Mortimer & Monica Kirkpatrick
Johnson, New Perspectives on Adolescent Work and the Transition to Adulthood, in
New Perspectives _on Adolescent Risk Behavior 425 (Richard Jessor ed., Cambridge U.
Press 1998); Mark Schoenha1s, Marta Tienda & Barbara Schneider, The Educational
and Personal Consequences of Adolescent Employment, 77 Soc. Forces 723, 723-762
( 1998). More limited employment during adolescence (twenty hours or less per week
during school) has been associated with reduced high school drop-out rates. R.
D'Amico, supra n. 16, at 152-164; see Jennifer C. Lee & Jeremy Staff, When Work
Matters: The Varying Impact of Adolescent Work Intensity on High School Drop-Out,
80 Soc. Educ. 158, 158-178 (2007); see generally John Robert Warren & Jennifer C.
Lee, The Impact of Adolescent Employment on High School Dropout: Differences by
Individual and Labor-Market Characteristics, 32 Soc. Sci. Res. 98, 98-128 (2003).
18. Richard Jessor & Shirley L. Jessor~ Problem Behavior and Psychological
Development: A Longitudinal Study of Youth (N.Y .. Acad. Press 1977) (describing
alcohol use, smoking, drug use and sexual activity as symbolic claims to adult status).
Negative outcomes associated with high-intensity work may result from "precocious
development," the assertion of independent adult-like status by teens assuming "adult"
roles because of school completion, employment, and individual decision-making.
Jerald Bachman & John E. Schulenberg, How Part- Time Work Intensity Relates to
Drug Use, Problem Behavior, Time Use and Satisfaction Among High School Seniors:
Are These Consequences or Merely Correlates?, 29 Dev. Psycho!. 220 (describing
"precocious adult-like identity" formation). These foster more deviant behavior,
especially for those working with delinquent peers. Adolescents who are employed
alongside delinquent coworkers tend to commit more workplace crime, as well as
demonstrate more general deviance than do those who do not work with deJinquent
peers. See Matthew Ploeger, Youth Employment and Delinquency.• Reconsidering a
Problematic Relationship, J5 Criminology 659 ( 1997); John Paul Wright & Francis T.
Cullen, Juvenile Involvement in Occupational Delinquency, 38 Criminology 863

(2000).
19.

See infra nn. 59-65 and accompanying text.
20. Only motor vehicle accidents, violence, and recreation do more damage to
American teens. See generally Center for Disease Control and Prevention, WorkRelated Injuries and Illnesses Associated with Child Labor United States, 1993, 45
Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 464, 464-468 (1996); D. Laraque, B. Barlow & M.
Durkin, Prevention of Youth Injuries, 91 J. Natl. Med. Assn. 557, 557-571 ( 1999).
21.
Pau1 A. Schu1te et al.; Integrating Occupational Safety and Health
Information Into Vocational and Technical Education and Other Workforce
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workers are consistently between 60%-70% higher than the rates for
workers of all ages and second only to rates for workers eighteen to
22
Estimates range up to 200,000-plus
twenty-four years of age.
adolescent workers suffering job-related injuries and illnesses each
23
year, a staggering number. Moreover, there is good reason to believe
our count is lower than the actual numbers.
Our child labor laws restrict private remedies for youth workers,
while placing primary responsibility for enforcement on administrative
agencies that consistently fail to enforce even the limited prohibitions
24
As an illustrative example, enforcement activity
under current law.
of the Wage and Hour Division (WHD), the lead enforcement agency
Preparation Programs, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health 404, 404 (2005).
22.
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Nonfatal Occupational Injuries
and Illnesses Among Workers Treated in Hospital Emergency Departments United
States, 2003, 55 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rpt. 449, 449-452 (2006) [hereinafter
2003 Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses]; Ctrs. for Disease Control and
Prevention, Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Among Workers Treated in
Hospital Emergency Departments United States, 2004, 56 Morbidity & Mortality
Wkly. Rpt. 393, 393-397 (2007) [hereinafter 2004 Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and
Illnesses]; Natl. Inst. for Occupational Safety and Health, NIOSH Alert: Preventing
Deaths, Injuries and Illness of Young Workers, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs.
Ctrs.
for
Disease
Control
2,
http://www .cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2003128/pdfs/2003128.pdf (2003) [hereinafter NIOSH Alert].
23.
Natl. lnst. for Occupational Safety and Health, Safety and Health Topic:
Young Worker Safety and Health 1,
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/NIOSHRecsDOLHaz/pdfs/DOL-recomm.pdf (2002)
[hereinafter NIOSH 2002 Recommendations]. Work-related illness data is even more
difficult to document than injuries because of the long latency period often associated
with these pathologies.
24.
In stark contrast to minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the
FLSA and most civil rights statutes, federal law gives no private right of action for
children injured or killed while working. See e.g., Breitwieser v. KMS lndust., Inc.,
467 F.2d 1391, 1392 (5th Cir. 1972); Henderson v. Bear, 948 F.2d 144, t 44-146 (Colo.
App. 1988). The most effected persons aggrieved minor employees and their
parents are thus unable to sue as "private attorneys general." Between 1988 and 2008
no employer faced a criminal prosecution for violation of the Act. See generally 29
U .S.C. § 216(a) (20 10). Despite the dangers in farm work, in 2006 just twenty-eight of
I ,344 federal child labor investigations 2% targeted agribusiness. Child wbor
Enforcement: Are We Adequately Protecting Our Children? Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, I lOth Cong. (statement of Sally Greenberg, Executive
Director, National Consumers League) 5, http://www.nclnet.org/worker-rights/82child-labor/308-ncl-testimony-to-house-on-child-labor-enforcement (2008). In 2005,
the number was even lower just twenty·five. /d. In addition, a "one free bite" rule is
in effect; employers may be jailed only after a prior criminal conviction for violation
child labor laws.
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at the federal level, has consistently and dramatically declined over the
25
past decade.
WHD's considerable rulemaking powers have likewise
26
Enforcement of state laws is similarly almost nonatrophied.
27
existent.
Nor is this a merely a contemporary phenomenon. Historically,
restrictions on ,child labor have always been more symbolic than real.
Where youth were cost-effective substitutes for mechanization or adult
labor, the FLSA and state statutes had little impact. Child labor
statutes have always been riddled with exceptions that frequently
28
overwhelm statutory norms, with enforcement almost non-existent,

25.
See Child Labor Coa1ition, Protecting Working Children in the United States:
The Government's Striking Decline in Child Labor Enforcement Activities 1,
http://www .stopchi ldlabor.org/pressroom/CLC%20report%20Sept% 202006. pdf
(2006).
26. Despite thirty-eight urgent proposed changes to the existing DOL Hazardous
Orders by the National Institute on Occupational Health and Safety (NJOSH) proposed
in 2002, see NIOSH 2002 Recontmendations, supra n. 23; DOL has, to date, adopted
only four. DOL has also ignored all proposals to change the agricultural Hazardous
Occupation Orders. See id.; Child Labor Regulations, Orders and Statements of
Interpretation; Child Labor Violations-Civil Money Penalties, 69 Fed. Reg. 75382
(Dec. 16, 2004).
27.
Most states lack the resources needed to effectively enforce child labor laws.
The number of enforcement officers is dwindling and there are few child labor
invesf1 ~afIons.
·
2004***
2000*
2003**
40
Total number of state labor
28
19
inspectors devoted
exclusively to child labor
..

*In 2000, 39 states reported their statistics to the CLC~
**In 2003, 39 states reported their statistics to the CLC.
***In 2004, 32 states reported their statistics to the CLC.
Infonnation gathered from the Child Labor Coalition, Child Labor State
Surveys, http://www .stopchi ldlabor.org/USchildlabor/ (accessed Jan. 29,
2011) [hereinafter 2004 CLC State Survey].
In 2004, only five states
conducted inspections targeting child labor compliance in agriculture; a mere
three states found any child labor violations with a total of nine minors in
two states, while the third could not-provide figures. /d. (including a table that
indicates each responding state's statistics).
28. The Keating-Owen Act of 1916, for example, affected less than 10%
of all working children. See infra nn. 103-109 and accompanying text.
Subsequent legislation followed the same pattern. Restrictions on the
employment of youths in the NRA codes followed the principles of the
Keating-Owen Act and applied to only one out of every six employed
youngsters between the ages of ten and sixteen reported by the I 930 Census to
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29

either in court or administratively.
As a result, American law de facto permits and even prods
adolescents to work, either full- or part-time. Unfortunately, today's
workplace encourages
[y ]oung people [to] perform tasks and use skills ... that few
perform or use again in work settings after they cease to be
adolescents . . . [These jobs provide] little meaningful
contact with adults who have a stake in their socialization
for the future ... [E]conomic rewards ... typical I y are used
for . . . records, movies, designer clothing, fast food,
alcohol, drugs and not for long-term "adult" investments,
such as college, or for increasing the adolescent's ability to
30
establish an independent household.

In addition, the law provides adolescents extraordinary freedom to
make independent decisions on work and school. As a matter of
federal law, no parental consent or even notice is required before a
child may work. In many states, children may withdraw from school
31
without parental notice or consent once a minimum age is attached.

be working. Jeremy P. Felt, The Child Labor Provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 11 Lab. Hi st. 467, 473 ( 1970). When federal child labor
regulation was finally upheld in the FLSA, contemporary estimates indicated
only about 30,000-50,000 employed children would be effected in nonagricultural occupations, but about 850,000 children fifteen years of age and
younger were gainfully employed. /d. at 477. Exclusions from the FLSA,
e.g., work in retail and street trades or in agriculture, allowed children to fill
niches in the economy where it was, and is, profitable to use them.
29.
30.
31.

See supra nn. 24-27 and accompanying text.
Greenberger, supra n. 12, at 88-89.

In twenty-two states, students may leave school at sixteen without
parental consent. See e.g., Ala. Code§ 16-28-3 (2011). Astonishingly, a mere
twenty-one states limit children under the age of sixteen to three hours of work
per day during the school year, see e.g. Ala. Code§ 25-8-36 (2011); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. §23-233 (2011); Cal. Lab. Code§ 1391(a)(2) (2010); and only
thirty-eight jurisdictions require parental consent for under-sixteens to work.
U.S. Dept. of Lab., Employment/Age Certification,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/certification.htm (accessed Jan. 29, 2010).
Only sixteen states mandate parental consent for sixteen-and seventeen-yearold adolescents to work, three of which only mandate consent during school
hours. /d. Forty-four states allow children aged sixteen and seventeen to
work forty or more hours during weeks while school is in session. U.S. Dept.
of Lab., Wage and Hour Division, Selected Child State Labor Standards,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/state.htm (accessed Jan. 29, 201 0). Thirty states
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My purpose here is to analyze how American law arrived at this
laissez-faire position regarding child labor that creates such
overwhelmingly negative results. This Article proceeds as follows:
Part Two briefly outlines the history of child labor in the United States
and early state attempts to regulate its worst abuses. Part Three
describes efforts until the 1920s by the federal government to limit
exploitation of youth workers. This Part details the previously untold
factual and legal history of several important United States Supreme
Court cases dealing with child labor, especially the famous decision in
32
Hammer v. Dagenhart. Unearthed from the case record found at the
Library of Congress, the story of Hammer, and its follow up cases,
illustrates the litigation strategy of powerful mill owners in North
Carolina before a hand-picked conservative federal district court judge
and a Supreme Court determined to block efforts to limit business
immunity.
Part Four follows this history to the 1920s and 1930s, detailing
the struggle to pass a new constitutional amendment and statutes
restricting child labor. With Locknerism demolished by the Great
Depression of the 1930s, the passage of the FLSA and its subsequent
legitimation by a reformed Supreme Court seemed to spell victory
against employer use of child labor. This victory was, in fact, pyrrhic.
The weaknesses of the FLSA resulted in the continuation of youth
employment. These statutory deficiencies were the outcome of a toxic
combination of factors: profits from cheap labor, entrenched and
powerful economic interests, and racism. This explanation is most
dramatically illustrated in the exclusion of agricultural workers,
including children, from coverage by the FLSA.
II. HISTORY OF CHILD LABOR REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

The Formative Period and Subsequent Industrialization

As with many economic and social issues, the roots of American
child labor are found in England. The crowded English cities in the
33
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were full of crime and poverty.
do not even require work or age pennits for youths aged sixteen or seventeen.
U.S. Dept. of Lab., Employment/Age Certification,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/certification.htm (accessed Jan. 29, 201 0).
32.
33.

247 U.S. 251, 251 ( 1918).
Marvin Ventrell, The Practice of Law for Children, 28 Ham line J. Pub. L. &
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class much of this was created by
35

Elizabethan Poor Relief Act of 1601 dictated that blood relatives
were the primary source of support for family members but local
governmental units were responsible for those unable to sustain
36
Public bodies were reluctant,
themselves with private resources.
however, to spend money for social welfare. As a result, the poor,
including impoverished children, were often "transported" to the
37
A 1627 letter, for example,
developing colonies in the New World.
notes "there are many ships going to Virginia, and with them fourteen
38
or fifteen hundred children, 'mostly paupers. '"
By the late 1700s there was active promotion of the employment
of children in the quickly-developing cotton industry, which brought
39
the industrial revolution to the United States. By 1816, New England
mills employed 100,000 workers, of whom 24,000 were "boys under
40
seventeen" and 66,000 "women and girls." Workers in these by now
large industrial factories were often employed through a "family wage

Policy 75, 79 (2006).
34. Catherine G. Trinkley, Child Labor in America: An Historical Analysis, 13 In
Pub. Int. 59, 63 (1993).
35.
43 Eliz. Ch. 2, § 7 (Eng. 1601 ).
The Elizabethan Poor Relief Act of 1601 mandated that father and
36.
grandfather, the mother and the grandmother, and the children of every poor, old, blind,
lame, and impotent person support that relative to the extent of his or her ability. 43
Eliz. Ch. 2, §6 (Eng. 1601); see also Robin M. Jacobson, Americana Healthcare Ctr. v.
Randal: The Renaissance of Filial Responsibility, 40 S.D. L. Rev. 518, 527 (1995).
37.
This would "render [children] useful members of society" and lessen the need
for the community to support families while husbands were away at sea for long
periods of time. Elizabeth Lewis Otey, The Beginnings of Child Labor Legislation in
Certain States II (Amo Press 1974).
38.
Trinkley, supra n. 34, at 64.
39.
In the 1790s, Samuel Slater and his New England partners began a factory
that combined all stages of manufacture from raw cotton to yarn in one structure. The
first employees of the factory were nine boys from poor families in the vicinity. In
contrast to earlier practice these children were factory laborers, rather than apprentices.
By 1801 , the number of children increased to one hundred ranging in age from four to
ten. The children became the "little fingers . . . of the gigantic automatons of
laborsaving machinery." U.S. Bureau of Lab., Charles Patrick Neill, Report on
Condition of Women and Child Wage-Earners in the United States 48 (Govt. Printing
Off. 191 0).
40.
American State Papers, Protection to the Manufacturers of Cotton Fabrics, 3
Finance 83, 14th Cong., I st Sess. (Feb. 13, 1816).

100

WHITTIER JOURNAL OF CHILD AND FAMILY ADVOCACY [Vol. 10:1
41

system,'' in which all members worked and received one lump sum.
Every memb,e r of the family above age seven worked in the factory
from sunrise to sunset, six days a week. Children's wages were
42
calculated and graded according to age.
Nor was this youth work aberrational. Throughout the colonies
children worked in various capacities. ''Bound out" children were
43
taken in by strangers with the expectation that children would work.
Indentured service was a practice inherited from England, based on the
legal presumption that the child owed service to his or her parent who
44
could assign that service to others.
Apprenticeship involved a
contract between a parent and another adult promising to provide
practical training in a trade or craft in exchange for service by the child.
These ubiquitous arrangements were often more exploitative than
protective of the well-being of children. Some parents and other
custodians even advertised the availability of their children to perform
45
labor.
In sum, children were an integral part of the production process in
the early United States. The sanctity of work and fear of idleness were
46
the accepted rationales for these employment relationships.
Children's working was accepted not only to increase production at
minimum expense but also to control poor and potentially criminal
elements of society.
As population and industrialization grew, particularly in the
second half of the nineteenth century, the total number of young
workers increased dramatically. In the thirty years between 1870,

41. In New England rural families tended to move to the mill and lived in a
community built and owned by the company. Hugh D. Hindman, Child Labor: An
American History 35-36 (M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 2002).
42.
Thomas Dublin, Women At Work: The Transformation of Work and
Community in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1826-1860 173 (2d ed. Columbia U. Press
1979)~ A maJe. .headed family with three working children received approximately
65% of the annual family income from the children's labor. /d.
43.
David Ray Papke, Pondering Past Purposes: A Critical History of American
Adoption IA,w, 102 W.Va. L. Rev. 459,460 (1999).
44.
This legal concept was to provide a key element in Hammer v. Dagenhart.
See infra nn. 177-179 and accompanying text. Michael Grossberg, Governing the
Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth Century America 259 (U. N.C. Press 1985).
45.
Papke, supra n. 43, at 461.
46. Robert Bremner et aL, Children and Youth in America.~ A Docum,enta.ry
History, Vol. 1: 1600:..J865 147 (Am. Public Health Assn. 1970) [hereinafter Children
and Youth VoL 1].
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when occupational information about youths ten through fourteen was
first collected, and 1900, the Census reveals a startling rise in both the
number and proportion of children entering the labor force. By 1900,
six percent of children gainfully employed were between ten and
fifteen years, and there were officially more than 1.75 million youth
47
Children in the post-Civil War South were
workers in America.
particularly encouraged to work due to the loss of men in battle and the
desire to provide cheap labor for the new textile mills beginning in the
South. One-third of the workforce in southern textile mills was
48
between ten and thirteen years of age.
Another factor contributing to child labor was massive
immigration. Between 1860 and 1890, over ten million immigrants
49
arrived in the United States. They joined the considerable number of
the poor already here. These families faced poverty and chronic
1
underemployment. so Parents commonly sent their children to works
and often opposed child labor refortn because of the desperate need for
52
Children's work in nineteenth and twentieth
additional income.
53
century America was parental property, stemming from the rule that

A total of 1,750,178 children were employed, an increase of one million
children since 1870. See William Lerner, Historical Statistics of the United States:
Colonial Times to 1970, U.S. Dept. of Commerce: Bureau of the Census 75-84 (1975).
48. Employment of children in Southern states in industry became more common
47.

in the late 1800s as the region's textile industry expanded. By 1900, more children
worked in southern mills than in any other part of the United States. By 1906, southern
mills employed an estimated 60,000 children under the age of fourteen. See Stephen
Wood, Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era 8 (U. Chi. Press 1968). These
figures did not include the many children under the age of ten who were known to be at
work. /d.
49.
U. S. Citizenship and lmmig. Servs., 2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics
11,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2002/
IMM2002.pdf
(accessed Jan. 29, 20 11).
50. See e.g., John Modell, Changing Risks, Changing Adaptations: American
Families in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, in Kin and Communities: Families
in America 119, 128 (Allan J. Lichtman & Joan R. Challinor eds., Smithsonian Press
1979) (describing child labor in working-class families "as an attempt to pool risks in
what was experienced as a very uncertain world").
51.
William J. Cooper, Jr. & Thomas E. Terrill , The American South: A History,
Vol. 2, 617-619 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2009).
52.
Viviana A. Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value
of Children 69-10 (Basic Books 1985).
53.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Myer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1059-1061 (1992).
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54

parents were legally entitled to their offspring's services.
At the end
of the nineteenth century approximately 400,000 children, five to
5
eighteen years of age, were employed in New York alone. 5
Although the immigrant population remained· largely
concentrated in urban areas, work by children in agrarian areas was
also frequently an econo.m ic necessity and, indeed, was seen as
essential to a child's upbringing. From the beginning, the prevailing
American ethos was that agricultural labor provided training for
56
adulthood and independence.
After the Civil War, however,
population ,i ncreasingly migrated from rural communities to larger
57
From 1900 to 1920, the urban population in the
industrial cities.
United States grew by 80%, while rural populations correspondingly
.
58
.
dechned.
The short- and long-term hazards of work in these industrial
workplaces were often great. Unhealthy and dangerous working
Homer H. Clark; The lAw of Domestic R-elations in the United States
314 (2d ed., West 1988); see Singer v. Brookman, 578 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. App.
1991); Porter v. Powell, 44 N.W. 295, 296 (Iowa 1890); Dembinski's Case,
120 N.E. 856, 857 (Mass. 1918); Rohm v. Stroud, 194 N#W.2d 307, 308
(Mich. 1972); Am. Prods~- Co. v~ Villwock, 109 P.2d 570, 579 (Wash., 1941).
As one state Supreme Court Justice asserted in 1888, "[i]t is a rule as old as
the common law that the father is entitled to the custody and control of his
minor children, and to receive their earnings." Eustice v. Plymouth Coal Co.,
13 A. 975, 976 (Pa. 1888). The right of parents to children's services,
however, correlated to the parent's obligation to support the child. Covey v.
Eppes, 153 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 1963); Beaudoin v. Beaudoin, 386 A.2d 1261,
1263 (N.H. 1978). This right is statutory today in many states. See e.g~, Cal.
Fam. Code § 7503 (West 2011) ("The employer of a minor shall pay the
earnings of the minor to the minor until the parent or guardian entitled to the
earnings gives the employer notice that the parent or guardian claims the
.J. Stat. Ann.
earnings."); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.2 (West 2011); N_
§ 9:1-1 (West 2011); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-21-5 (West 2010); R.I. Gen.
Laws§ 33-15J-l (West 2011 ).
55.
Jeremy P. Felt, Hostages of Fortune 36 (Syracuse U. Press 1965).
56. See infra nn. 359-362 and accompanying text; see also 41st Cong. Rec.
54.

1552 ( 1907) (statement of Sen. Beveridge):
This bill does not strike at the employment of children engaged in
agriculture.- l do not for a moment pretend that working children on the farm
is bad for them. I think it is the universal experience that where children are
employed within their strength and in the open air there can be no better
training.

ld.
57.

58.

Wood, supra n. 48, at 1-2.
/d.
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59

conditions abounded.
Workers were obliged to keep pace with
mechanized production. Women and youth were especially
60
vulnerable.
It is a sorry but indisputable fact that where children are
employed, the most unhealthful work is generally given
them. In the spinning and carding rooms of cotton and
woolen mills, where large numbers of children are
employed, clouds of lint-dust fill the lungs and menace the
health ... In bottle factories and other branches of glass
manufacture, the atmosphere is constantly charged with
microscopic particles of glass. In the wood-working
industries, such as the manufacture of cheap furniture and
wooden boxes, and packing cases, the air is laden with fine
·Sawdust. Children employed in soap and soap-powder
factories work, many of them, in clouds of alkaline dust
which inflames the eyelids and nostrils ... In the coal mines
the breaker boys breathe air that is heavy and thick with
particles of coal, and their lungs become black · in
61
consequence.
Children as young as eight worked in the mines, which then, as
62
now, were one of the most dangerous places to work.
While

59.
See e.g., Edwin Markham et al., Children in Bondage 63-65 (Hearst's Inti.
Lib. Co. 1914):
In a Pennsylvania establishment, where the temperature on the outside was
88 degrees, the temperature at the point where the snap-up rubs off the excess
glass was I 00 degrees; in front of the glory-hole it was 140 degrees ... The
speed rate of the snapping-up boy is fixed by the output of the shop, and in
case of such small wares as one ounce and under he must work with great
rapidity ... In one factory, ... the distance from bench to oven was one hundred
feet, and the carry-in boys made seventy-two trips in an hour.
/d.
60.
See generally Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, 87 N.E. 229, 229-236 (Ind. 1909)
(thirteen-year old's legs crushed by carload of iron after working eleven hours and
falling asleep); Sitts v. Waiontha Knitting Co., Inc., 87 N.Y.S. 911 , 911 (1904) (fifteenyear-old severely injured in rollers of knitting machine); Marino v. Lehmaier, 66 N.E.
572, 572-573 (N.Y. 1903) (thirteen-year-old's fingers cut off in printing press).
61.
John Spargo, The Bitter Cry of the Children 175-80 (1906), reprinted in
Robert Bremner et al., Children and Youth in America: A Documentary History, Vol.
II: 1868-1932) [hereinafter Children and Youth Vol. lfJ.
62. Louis Hine, a sociologist and photographer working for the National
Child Labor Committee, noted: "then the pieces (in the coal mines of
Pennsylvania) rattled down through long chutes at which the breaker boys
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information gathering was difficult, it is believed that young boys
under the age of sixteen had twice as many accidents as adult workers,
63
while girls had three times as many accidents as adult women.
The best known example of this physical carnage is the New
York Triangle Shirt Waist factory fire in March of 1911 . One hundred
forty-six garment workers, many as young as fourteen, died in the fire.
Twelve- and thirteen-year-olds were also known to be working
64
fourteen-hour shifts at the factory. Death and injury to child workers
have been a consistent result of the employment of young people in

America. to the pres_ent day.

65

As child labor increased in number and intensity during the
nineteenth century, concerns concomitantly arose about the effect of
this employment on families, children and society. Compulsory
education was increasingly seen as the antidote to exploitative child
labor. Early compulsory school attendance laws, however, were
sat. These boys picked out the pieces of slate and stone that cannot burn. It's
like sitting in a coal bin all day long, except that the coals is always moving
and clattering and cuts the fingers."
Little Comrades Who Toll, 3 Child Lab. Bull. 72 (Natl. Child Lab. Comm. 1914). In
1902, a minister in Pennsylvania reported "I have seen boys going to the breaker that
did not seem really able to carry their dinner pail.'' Alan Derickson, Making Human
Junk: Child Labor as an Issue in the Progressive Era, 82 Am. J. Pub. Health 1280,
) 281 (1992).
63.
Julie Novkov, Hist:oricizing the Figure of the Child in Legal Discourse: The
Battle Over the Regulation of Child Labor, 44 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 369 (2000) (quoting
Edwin Markham, Ben Lindsey & George Creel, Children in Bondage 158-59 (Hearst's
Inti. Lib. Co. 1914)).
64.
For a detailed description of the deplorable conditions of the factory, the fire
and ensuing trial, visit Douglas Linder, Famous Trials,
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/FI'rials/triangle/trianglefire.html (accessed
Jan. 29, 2011 ).
65. See The Natl. lnst. for Occupational Safety and Health, Recommendations
from the NJOSH Child Labor Working Team, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/97-143/
(accessed Jan. 29, 2011 ). Fatalities of working youth are far too common, and they
have the highest rates of injury of any age group. Schulte, supra n. 21, at 404 41 1.
Work-related injury rates for juvenile workers have consistently been found to be
between 60%-70% higher than the rates for workers of an ages and second only to
rates for workers eighteen to twenty-four years of age. 2003 Nonfatal Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses, supra n. 22; 2004 Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses,
supra n. 22; NIOSH Alert, supra n. 22. Estimates range up to 200,000-plus ado1escent
workers suffering job-related injuries and illnesses each year, a staggering number.
NIOSH 2002 Recommendations, supra n. 23, at 7. Work-related illness data is even
m-o re difficult to document than injuries because of the long latency period often
associated with these pathologies.
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66

limited in scope and lacked enforcement mechanisrns.
Advocacy of
legal restrictions on youth employment and of mandatory school
attendance laws were complementary, and the two movements

developed simultaneously between 1830 and 1930~

67

In the mid-

1800s, . a few states also began setting minimum age requirements to
68
69
work
and limiting working hours.
These early child labor
70
prohibitions, however, were poorly enforced and rarely followed.
B.

Reform Efforts and the Progressive Era

Momentum for child labor regulation increased dramatically in
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, however, as huge
71
numbers of children entered the labor market.
Beginning with the
66.,
While many states in the nineteenth century required some compulsory school
attendance, they failed to create effective enforcement bodies or to fund regulatory
agencies to ensure compliance. AdditionaiJy the geography of many of the states
prevented effective compliance, as did the lack of an accurate census. See MichaelS.
Katz, A History of Compulsory Education Laws 18-21 (Phi Delta Kappa 1976)~ Age
was difficult to substantiate from parents and school records were notoriously
inaccurate. Trinkley, supra n. 34, at 75.
67.
Wayne J. Urban & Jennings L. Wagoner, Jr., American Education: A History
151-173 (4th ed., Routledge 1999).
68.
Children and Youth vol. I, supra n. 40, at 621. Most minimum ages ranged
from nine to thirteen years, but since proof of age was not required in any of the early
minimum age statutes, enforcement was practically impossible. /d. at 627.
Additionally, a number of these laws al1owed younger children in poor families to
work under "hardship exemptions." Hindman, supra n. 41; at 62.
69.. Most of the state laws regulating hours in the mid-1800s limited minor
workers to ten hours per day. Children and Youth VoL I, supra n. 40, at 628. Many
hour limitation laws, however, contained a "special contract" provision allowing
employees to work longer hours. Hindman, supra n. 41, at 62. Another method to
restrict a young person's employment,-of course, was to mandate .school atten<Jance for
a portion of the year. Studies indicated that labor at a young age hurt a child's
development and schooling improved it; contributing to the side by side development
of the movements. See William Aikman & Lawrence Kotin, Legal Foundations of
Compulsory School Attendance 45~53 (Kennikat Press 1980).
70.
Felt, supra n. 55, at 6, 17-37 (under-age children were hidden by factory
owners or by families when inspectors did visit workplaces; look-outs scouted the
approach of inspectors and if violations of the law were found, employers argued that
the children's age had been misrepresented to them or the youths were simply visitors).
71.
As in many social welfare issues, the United States lagged behind Europe.
The first Jaw regulating child labor was approved in Prussia in 1839; France followed
in 1841. Paul Perigord, The International Labor Organization: A Study of Labor and
Capital in Cooperation 39 (D. Appleton 1926); Carlos Crespo, When Labor Went
Global: The Road to the International Lnbor Organization, 37 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 129,
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development of the Progressive Movement in the 1890s, school
systems grew in size and complexity, new techniques of bureaucratic
control emerged and school officials developed more sophisticated
72
An
techniques to check on, and enforce, school attendance.
ideological component also surfaced; public schools were to be the
vehicle . to "Americanize" children, particularly those of immigrant
73
parents.
The Progressive Movement in the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries was comprised of religious organizations, women's
groups, trade unions and others advocating on behalf of a wide variety
74
of reforms.
In fact, ''Progressivism" was more a set of ideas than a
disciplined political movement. The legislative agenda included
restrictions upon child labor, enactment and enforcement of
compulsory school attendance laws, criminalizing abandonment and
75
abuse of children, and creating new Juvenile courts to deal with
76
"delinquent, acts.
Child welfare became the focus of the newly
77
developing social work profession.
The Progressives had a healthy respect for the power of positive
law and, as historian David J. Rothman notes, "were not afraid to

132 (2002).
72. See generally Kathy Emery, Alternative Schools: Diverted But Not Defeated,
Paper submitted to Qualification Committee at UC Davis, California,
http://www.educationanddemocracy .org/Emery/Emery_AltSchoolsPaper .htm
(July
2000).
73. See Gwendolyn Mink, The Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare
State, 1917-1942 77 (ComeH U. Press 1995).
74. See generally Wood,-supra n. 48. The-idea of the state as an agency of social
and economic reform and control was part of Progressive ideology.
75. There is much contemporary debate today about whether the Progressive
Era;s child-saving initiatives were more rescue or exploitation. "Orphan trains,"
carrying poor children from large, mainly Eastern, cities were sent to the Midwest to
live and work with fann families. Critics claim that this transfer removed children
from parents without valid consent and disregarded the best interests of the child. See
generally Marilyn Irvin Holt, The Orphan Trains: Placing Out in America 41-79 (U.
Neb. Press 1994); David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience~· The Asylum and
Its Alternatives in Progressive America 215 (Little Brown 1980); Papke, supra n. 43
(discussing Progressive movement).
76. Chicago established :the first juvenile court in 1899. By the end of World War
I only three states did not have juvenile courts along with diversion of youth offenders
from jail to local youth homes and other institutions. David S. Tanenhaus, Juvenile
Justice in the Making 24 (Oxford U. Press 2004).
77. Grossberg, supra n. 44, at 278-280.
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78

introduce the coercive force of law" in the service of their goals.
In
contradistinction to the benign bucolic image of children acquiring
79
skills and education through healthful farm labor, the Progressives
recharacterized child labor as exploitative of children and destructive to
80
society as a whole.
As a remedy, they forcefully advocated strong.e r
81
and more frequent use of the state's parens patriae power.
State
actors were to rescue children from unsatisfactory care by parents and
from forces, particularly economic_, which could deprive youths of the
82
schooling and health necessary to become productive adult citizens.
Opposition to youth employment began to build. The growing
Union movement supported child labor restrictions, partly for
humanitarian reasons and partly for economic factors relating to adult
unemplo ·ment and the downward drag on wages of masses of child

78.
Rothman, supra n. 75, at 207.
79.
See infra nn. 359-362 and accompanying text.
80.
This was the era of famous urban reformers like Florence Kelly, Jane Adams,
Jacob Riis, and many others. See generally David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic
Acts: Amending the U~S. Constitution, 1776-1995 255-261 (U. Press of Kan. 1996).
The "parens patriae" power of the state to protect the child's health, safety and
81.
welfare was now used to charge parents with abuse and neglect. This legal concept had
been present in Anglo-American law for centuries. The Elizabethan Poor Laws
authorized governmental removal of children from parents and outsourcing them as

apprentices. Massachusetts's records show children removed from homes already in
the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century in Virginia. Ventrell, supra n.
33, at 79. In the nineteenth century, the parens patriae doctrine was a familiar theme
in state court decisions. See e.g.., Fletcher v. People, 52 Ill. 395, 397 (1 869); Ex Parte
Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, ) 1-12 (Pa. 1839). By 1905; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
noted:
Every statute which is designed to give protection, care and training to
children, as a needed substitute for parental authority ... is but a recognition
of the duty of the state as the legitimate guardian and protector of children
when other guardianship fails.
Cmm.w. v. Fischer, 213 Pa. 48, 56-57 ( 1905).
82.
''Ignorant and untaught, deprived of childhood and of the benefits of
consecutive school life, the children in the canneries show little promise of developing
into citizens more valuable to the state than their immigrant parents." Pauline
Goldmark, Do Children Work in Canneries 10 (Consumer's League 1910), quoted in
Novkov, supra n. 63, at 381.
"It is perhaps unnecessary to mention the obvious fact that the child worker is
83.
in competition with the adult and drags down his wages." Lillian Wald, The House on
Henry Street 146 (Henry & Hold Co. 1971). Abolition of child labor was inc1uded in
the constitutions of the Knights of Labor and the Federation of Organized Trade
Unions, which later became the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Hindman, supra
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84

and became a catalytic agent for these legislative efforts.
Images of
children working in mines, canneries and textile mills, most forcefully
portrayed in the photo-journalistic work of Lewis Hine, fostered a
85
favorable public climate for restrictions on child labor.
By 1906,
86
forty-two states had some type of child labor legislation.
These statutory developments were occurring during the
81
Lochner era, a time when federal courts were particularly resistant to
legislation limiting the prevailing "laissez fa ire'' economic theory.
Child labor restrictions were, of course, promptly challenged as
unconstitutional violations of "liberty of contract" and government
interference with the parent-child relationship. While the United States_
Supreme Court and the federal courts were hospitable to a variety of
these constitutional claims, state courts were far less sympathetic to
these same arguments. State courts tended to uphold protection of
working children as a lawful exercise of the state's parens patriae
88
power. For example, in Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, a thirteen-yearold was employed in the steel mill working six days per week and
twelve to fourteen hours per day. When his leg was severed in an
industrial accident he sued for damages under negligence theory,
premised upon violation of the Indiana law that prohibited under
sixteen-year-olds working more than sixty hours per week or ten hours
89
per day. The steel mill argued that the statute violated the Fourteenth
n. 41, at 49. As a young labor leader in New York, Samuel Gompers pushed for
regulation of child labor, and later, as President of the AFL, he consistently supported
child labor reform. /d.; see Felt, supra n. 55, at 10-13, 60, 196-197; Samuel Gompers,
Laborand the Common Welfare 129 (EP Dutton & Co. 1919).
84. Walter Trattner, Crusade for the Children: A History of the National Child
Labor Committee and Child Labor Refonn in America 35 (Quadrangle Books 1970).
85.
See Kyvig; supra n. 80, at 259-261.
41 Cong. Rec. S 1809-1810 (I 907).
86.
87.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 ( 1905) (invalidating New York law
limiting bakers to sixty-hour work weeks). During this period of time, approximately
1890-1937, the federal judiciary and particularly the United States Supreme Court
articulated a theory of "liberty;' under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that
included a "freedom" to contract. It is estimated that more than 175 state laws were
found unconstitutional in this period. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law:
Principles and Policies 616 (3d .ed., Aspen 2006). At the same time, the Court was
concomitantly striking down federal statutes as beyond Congress; power under the
Commerce Clause or as violating the Tenth Amendment. See Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 268, 277 ( 1918) (holding unconstitutional federal statute limiting child labor).
88~
Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, 87 N.E. 229,231 (Ind. 1909).
89.
/d. at 232.
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Amendment, but the Indiana Supreme Court responded:
Children under 16 years of age are wards of the state, and
are pre-eminently fit subjects for the protecting care of its
police power ....The employment of children of tender years
in mills and factories not only endangers their lives and
limbs, but hinders and dwarfs their growth and development
physically, mentally, and morally. Defendant argues "it
deprives the defendant of liberty and of its property without
due process of law" and equal protection ... We think it quite
90
obvious that the point is not well taken ...
Numerous other state courts routinely upheld child labor protective
91
measures.
Yet these state legislative and court victories rested on an
unstable foundation. The actual effect on the employment of children
was often negligible. Lack of governmental enforcement of child labor
restrictions and compulsory school attendance laws was widespread
92
throughout the United States.
The South was particularly resistant.
For example, in North Carolina, site of the coming legal battle on
federal restrictions of child labor, efforts to restrict the minimum age of
youth workers faced opposition from mill owners employing children
as young as nine. The destitute parents of these youth workers were
93
It took until 1904 to limit child labor in
often likewise opposed.

90.
Yedinak, 87 N.E. at 234-235; Fitzgerald v. Inti Flax Twine Co., 104 Minn. ·
138, 145 (1908).
See e.g., Ex Parte Spencer, 86 P. 896, 896-897 (Cal. 1906); Fitzgerald v. Inti
91.
Flax Twine Co., 104 Minn 138, 146 (1908); Bryant v. Skillman Hardware Co., 76
N.J.L. 45, 45-46 (1908); People v. Taylor, 192 N.Y. 398, 399-400 (1908); State v.
Shorey, 86 P. 881, 881-882 (Ore. 1906).
92.
Violators were rarely fined or otherwise punished, and many parents were
unaware of any restrictions on employing children. Children and Youth, Vol. I, supra
n. 40, at 628-630. And, in any event, poor parents desperately needed the income from
their children's work. While southern manufacturing states were setting minimum age
standards for child labor, none provided means of enforcement of these statutes. In
North Carolina, for example, the Bureau of Labor Commissioner could only collect
information from manufacturers through questionnaires, not inspections. To insist
upon plant visits would question the honesty of the plant owner. Early efforts in North
Carolina to deterntine the number of children working in factories consisted of mailed
inquiries to factory owners, who often failed to answer. Elizabeth H. Davidson, Child
Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States 102, 126 (U. N.C. Press 1939).
93.
Davidson, supra n. 92, at 118, 121. It was estimated that over 10,000 children
under age twelve were working in textile mills in South Carolina in 1901. In 1904 the
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North Carolina to over twelve-year-olds and a maximum work week of
94
sixty~six hours. Even then, younger children classified as apprentices
95
Not until 1918 were children aged
were excepted from these Jimits.
ten to fourteen required to attend school for the entire school term and
96
Southern mill owners
restricted from the most dangerous worksites.
successfully harnessed regional resentments and fears to block labor
97
law change.
Reform efforts varied dramatically across the country. Many
states had little or no budget for inspections and few effective penalties
98
States seeking to attract capital and industry and
for noncompliance.
to increase industrial production had incentives to have lax or no
legislation on youth employment, creating a classic "race to the
bottom." In 1907, Senator Albert Beveridge of Indiana characterized
the situation as follows:
Here is an abstract of the state laws upon the subject of child
labor. There are not six of them alike. Some have no childlabor laws at all; others are worse than any laws, because
they are pretenses at labor legislation which make the people
and the country think that something has been done, when,
as a matter of fact, nothing has been done, and the ruin that
went on before without the sanction of the law continues
99
under the sanction of the law .
Federal action was the only realistic way to effectively combat child
labor.

ill. ACTION ATTHEFEDERALLEVEL
The first federal legislative action came in 1906, with a proposal
by Indiana Senator Albert Beveridge and Representative Herbert
Parson to prohibit interstate shipments from factories and mines
North Carolina legislature agreed to set the age of twelve as the minimum age of child
manufacturing workers.
94. /d. at 120.
95.
/d. at 251.
96.
/d. at 76.
97.
Child labor opponents were labeled "Yankees" and their proposed legislation
as "Yankee doings" in an attempt to use Civil War memories to block refonn. /d. at
121.
Novkov, supra n. 63, at 373.
98.
41 Cong. Rec. 1808 ( 1907).
99.
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employing children under fourteen.
As a progressive reformer and
police commissioner in New York City, Theodore Roosevelt had
supported limits on child labor, but as President in 1906 he scuttled the
Beveridge Bill, substituting a federal study of female and child labor in
101
Ultimately, the study resulted in at least twenty volumes
its place.
of data and text demonstrating the health, educational and other
102
In 1912,
problems associated with employment of these workers.
reformers . succeeded in passing legislation creating the Children's
103
Bureau,
the first federal agency to deal with children. The Bureau
acted as a research organization on youth issues and developed into an
advocacy group for reform.
The first substantive federal regulation of child labor came with
104
The Act banned the
passage of the Keating-Owen Act in 1916.
entry into interstate commerce of the "products" of mines,
manufacturers or other producers who had employed child labor in
105
children under sixteen working in mines and
defined categories;
quarries and under fourteen working in factories and some other
worksites were barred from employment. The statute also limited
youth between fourteen and sixteen to an e'i ght-hour day and a forty106
eight-hour week.
The Act was a symbolic victory, but practically ineffective.
Foreshadowing later federal enactments, many working childrenespecially in agriculture and other worksites were omitted from
coverage. Owen Lovejoy., chair of the National Child Labor Coalition
(NCLC) estimated in 1917 that perhaps 150,000 working children were

100.
John Brae man, Alfred J. Beve-ridge and the First National Child Labor Bill,
60 Ind. Mag of History I, 19-20 (1964).
101. Pub. L. No. 59-41, § 432, 34 Stat. 866 (1907) (authorized the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor to "investigate and report on the industrial, social, moral,
educational, and physical condition of women and child workers in the United States").
I 02. 46 Con g. Rec.. 1806 ( 191 I).

103.

Pub~

L. No. 62-116, § 73,37 Stat 79 (1912)~

I 04.
Pub. L. No. 64-249, § 432,-39 Stat. 675 (1916). The bill passed the House
by a vote of 237-45, but had been blocked for almost one year in the Senate by North
Carolina Senator Lee Overman; Trattner, supra n. 84, at 132.
105. 39 Stat at 675.
106. /d. Criminal penalties attached to violations of the Act. /d. (first conviction
10 be punished by a fine of not more than $200 and each subsequent conviction to be
punished by a fine of not more than $1000 or by imprisonment of not more than three
months or both).
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affected by the statute, while 1,850,000 were not.
No legal remedies
were provided to workers themselves. But perhaps the most salient
reason for the Keating-Owen Act's failure was the abject poverty of
millions of families who desperately needed the income from child
108
labor to exist.
Reuben Da . e.nhart, nominal plaintiff in a case
$15.00 per week "he and his brother and sister brought in a total of
110
$17.00 per week" to sustain the family.
A.

Roland Dagenhart and the Supreme Court

"Test case" litigation, particularly in the federal courts, has long
been the weapon of choice for powerful economic and politically
:c onservative forces in the United States. Child labor is but one of many
111
examples.
Even before the passage of the Keating-Owen Act,
employers, particularly Southern textile owners, prepared to challenge
112
and publisher
it. David Clark, son of a distinguished Southern jurist
of the Southern Textile Bulletin, organized southern mill owners into
the Southern Cotton Manufacturers, led by an active Executive
113
Clark was to become the key character in the child
Committee.

Felt, supra n. 28, at 471.
See generally Zelizer, supra n. 52, at 69-71.
I 09.
See generally Hammer, 241 U.S. 251 (1918).
II 0. Felt, supra n. 28, at 471.
Ill. See Benjamin R. Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez Faire
Came to the Supreme Court 241-243 (Greenwood Press 1973) (Conservative Liberty
League mounts court challenges to laws it had opposed in Congress); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 340-342 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal Act); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 541-551 ( 1935) (invalidating National
Industrial Recovery Act); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 204 (1908) (creating fiction
that suit against State Attorney General was suit against a private individual, negating
Eleventh Am-e ndment prohibition against suits against states in federal courts).
112.
Wood, supra n. 48, at 42. Walter Clark, David Clark's father, was a
progressive Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court and had been
considered by President Woodrow Wilson for nomination to the United States Supreme
Court.ld.
113.
Wood, supra n. 48, at 42, 44-45; Hindman, supra n. 41, at 66-67. In the
spring of l915, Clark organized the Executive Committee of Southern Cotton
Manufacturers, hiring former North Carolina Governor W.W. Kitchin to fight passage
of restrictions on child labor in Congress. Wood, supra n. 48, at 44-45, 48-49;
Hindman, supra n. 41, at 66-67. ln 1914, North Carolina Senator Lee Overman had
blocked the Palmer-Owen child labor bill, which had passed the House by a vote of
237-45, from coming to a vote in the Senate for over a year, but mi11 owners saw that
107.
I 08.
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labor litigation drama about to unfold. Upon founding the Southern
Textile Bulletin in 1911, Clark used the trade journal to lead the
industry in opposition to government intervention, unionism and other
114
"evils."
His group funded court efforts opposing federal restrictions
115
on child labor and vowed to take the fight to the Supreme Court.
For this battle, Clark retained John G. Johnson, a brilliant
Philadelphia corporate attorney and a long-time leader of the American
bar, who, according to constitutional historian Edward S. Corwin had
"~haped the American Ba~ As~ociation into a 'sort o.f juristic. sewin~
11
ctrcle for mutual educatton 1n the gospel of Latssez Fatre. '"
Although Johnson was in poor health, he maintained regular letter
correspondence with Clark, advising him of case strategy. Among his
most prescient comments to Clark was: "[i]f possible, a judicial district
should be selected in which the judge is a man of known courage; this
117
is no case to try before a weak character."
After Johnson's death, he
118
a partner at O'Brien,
was replaced by attorney Junius Parker,
Boardman, Parker and Fox of New York, one of the best known
119
High powered local counsel
corporate law firms in the country.
were also retained, including Clement Manly of Winston-Salem and
120
William P. Bynum of Greensboro, North Carolina.

public sentiment was changing. Hindman, supra n. 41, at 66. "Realizing that they were
unlikely to defeat the child labor bill again, their strategy was to delay its passage and
'load' the Congressional Record with arguments that could later be used in litigation."
Hindman, supra n. 41, at 66-67; Wood, supra n. 48, at 48-51. Aside from the
testimony offered by James Emery, general counsel of the National Association of
Manufacturers, the Executive Committee was the only group opposed to child labor
legislation to speak before Congress. Hindman, supra n. 41, at 66-67.
114. Wood, supra n. 48, at 42-43.
I 15.
Hindman, supra n. 41, at 67. Many mill owners were pessimistic about
success, but Clark aggressively pursed donations via the Southern Textile Bulletin to
fund the legal battle. /d.
116.
Wood, supra n. 48, at 82.
117.
/d.at88.
118.
/d. at 85. Parker was also general counsel for the American Tobacco
Company, a leading litigator, and had participated in the landmark antitrust/monopoly
suit U.S. v.Am. TobaccoCo.,221 U.S.l06(1911). ld.
119.
/d. The finn's senior partner, Morgan J. O'Brien, was one of a select group of
lawyers who argued most of the important business litigation heard by the Supreme
Court. /d.
120.
/d. at 92. Manly and his firm, Manly, Hendron and Womble, were located in
Winston-Salem. He was also an influential leader of the American Bar Association.
Bynum was nationally known as one of the ablest southern counsels to appear before
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Clark and Attorney Parker met on several occasions to discuss the
upco,m ing litigation. Rather than await criminal prosecution of a mill
for violating the federal Keating-Own Act, which would take time and
cede the choice of forum, they opted to affirmatively seek an injunction
on behalf of a child employed in compliance with state law but
121
threatened with dismissal because of the federal statute.
Clark, the
Southern Cotton Manufacturers, and their counsel chose James
Edmund Boy,d , of the Western District of North Carolina, as the most
122
promising federal judge.
Boyd had served in the Confederate Army,
but later his conservative politics led him to the Republican Party;
where he had been a member of the Republican National Committee.
123
He was personally familiar with Clark's counsei.
Clark next toured
Judge Boyd's Western District of North Carolina in search of the
"perfect combination of factors," and found four potential sets of
124
plaintiffs.
The Dagenhart family was ultimately selected, but had to
125
be coaxed to join the lawsuit.
Roland Dagenhart worked for the Fidelity Manufacturing
Company, a small cotton mill, and had no intention of filing suit before
126
he was approached by David Clark.
Roland had two children who
would be impacted by the federal child labor law. The older child,
Reuben, was fifteen, and under North Carolina law could work up to
127
eleven hours a day and sixty hours a week.
Under the federal statute
he would be reduced to eight hours a day. The younger Dagenhart,
John, fourte,en, was working up to eleven hours a day, but under the
federal law would not be allowed to work at alL Little compensation
was given to the Dagenharts for their participation in the case, although
later Reuben would admit that he and his brothers received a few
'

.

. .

the Supreme Court Both firms had prominent lawyers who knew Federal District
Judge Boyd both in and out of Court. /d.
121.
/d. at 92-93.. This strategy was modeled after the Arizona Anti-Alien case of
two years prior where the threatened injury of denial of employment resulted in a
successful injunction against the employer. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36

(1915).
122.
Wood, supra n. 48, at 91-92. Boyd had been an Assistant Attorney General of
the United States in 1897 under President McKinley, and in 1900 was named to the
federal bench in the Western District of North Carolina. /d.
123. /d. at 92.
124.
/d.
125. /d. at 92-93; Hindman, supra n. 41, at 68.
126.
Wood, supra n. 48, at 93.
127. /d.
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bottles of Coca-Cola and automobile rides for the use of their names in
128
the lawsuit.
On August 1, 1917, one month before the Keating-Owen Act was
to go into effect, officials at the Fidelity Manufacturing Company
posted a copy of the statute in their plant. A week later, on August 9,
the complaint was filed in Federal Court with Fidelity and William C.
Hammer, the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina,
129
named as defendants.
Plaintiff alleged that the Dagenhart boys were
employed in compliance with the child labor laws of North Carolina,
and that federal enforcement of the Keating-Owen Act would deprive
the elder Dajenhart of his vested rights to the services and wages of his
1 0
minor sons.
It was further alleged that his family was poor, and that
131
he (Roland) needed the compensation from his children's labor.
The suit argued the statute was beyond Congress' Commerce Clause
power because it regulated conditions of manufacturing and
132
contravened the Tenth Amendment.
In addition, enforcement would
deprive plaintiffs of liberty and property without due process of law
under the Fifth Amendment. All these were familiar themes in the·
133
constitutional jurisprudence of the Lochner era.
The U.S. Attorney in North Carolina immediately contacted the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in D.C. to determine if it wanted to accept
134
the challenge on the merits or wait for a better case.
Reform groups
urged the DOJ to hire special government counsel for this important
litigation, and Thomas Parkinson, the director of the Legislative
Drafting Bureau at Columbia Law School, who had assisted in drafting
135
the bill in Congress, was immediately retained.
Roscoe Pound,
Dean of the Harvard Law School, was also retained, working pro
136
bono.
Immediately after the filing of the complaint on August 9, Judge
Boyd ordered Fidelity Manufacturing and the United States Attorney to

128.
129.
130.
131.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Hindman, supra n. 41, at 68.
Wood, supra n. 48, at 96-97.
/d. at97.
/d.
/d.
See generally Chemerinsky, supra n. 87, at 614-616.
Wood, supra n. 48, at 99.
/d. at I00.
/d. at 100-IOL
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show cause within twenty days as to why he should not issue an
injunction. On August 27, Fidelity filed its Answer to the plaintiffs
Complaint and was never heard from again at the trial and appellate
137
levels.
Its response to the Dagenhart's allegations was friendly and
coope~ative, admittinf all the complaint's factual allegatio~s and .the
13
U.S. Attorney Hammer responded 1n succtnct
legal tssue at hand.
fashion on August 29 with a one sentence Motion to Dismiss, asserting
139
the law's constitutionality~
That same day, Judge Boyd denied the
Motion to Dismiss and both sides immediately agreed to . narrow the
140
argument to the issue of the constitutionality of the statute.
At the hearing before Judge Boyd on August 30, the Southern
Cotton Manufacturers' attorneys acting in the name of the
Dagenharts argued that manufacturing was not part of interstate
commerce and congressional authority did not extend to productive
141
activities.
Attorney Bynum supplemented this by discussing the
142
nature of child-made goods.
While Congress had the power to close
the channels of interstate commerce to articles injurious to public
health, morals or safety, it possessed no power over articles that were
143
not themselves inherently dangerous.
Parkinson led the government
defense before Judge Boyd, but conceded that the Act was a departure
144
from prior legislation.
Parkinson's concession was highly
contentious within the defense team, as Dean Pound and others in the
DOJ believed that Parkinson should have argued that the Act fit easily
145
with prior national police power precedent in the Supreme Court.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

/d. at 101-102.
/d.
/d. at 102.
/d.
/d. at 102-103.
/d. at I 03.
/d.
144. /d. at 103-1 04. Parkinson made no effort to deny that the federal legislation
sought to regulate chi1d labor in manufacturing, and that it departed from prior statutes.
/d.
145.
/d. at 107-108. In a Jetter dated September 3, 1917, Pound wrote to U.S.
Attorney Gregory Pound:
Through an unhappy misunderstanding, the- government did not present a
consistent case. The district attorney and I understood that we were to argue
that in principle there was nothing about the law which the Supreme Court
had not already sanctioned. But Mr. Parkinson did not understand it as we
did and in his argument conceded the position for which the plaintiffs had
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Judge Boyd's decision to enjoin the Act came on August 31, but
14
he never filed a written opinion. b In an oral statement to both parties
endorsing plaintiffs arguments, he found the Act unconstitutional
because it was not a regulation of interstate commerce and contravened
147
Judge Boyd
the powers of the states under the Tenth Amendment.
specifically noted Attorney Parkinson's concession that the Keating148
Owen Act was unprecedented.
Congress could regulate trade
among the states, but not the conditions of labor producing the
149
He also spoke at length about the right
merchandise that was traded.
of the progenitor to control the behavior of his progeny, and warned
about social legislation that placed children in the power of the law or
150
police.
Judge Boyd then issued a terse injunction, enjoining Fidelity
from refusing to employ the Dagenhart boys and the United States
Attorney from attempting to enforce the provisions of the child labor
151
bill anywhere in the Western District of North Carolina.
The journey from Judge Boyd's decision on August 31 to the
United States Supreme Court was brief. On September 1, 1917, U.S.
15

for Appeal to the Supreme Court.
On September 18, Judge Boyd
issued a citation to both parties to appear before the High Court on
154
October 18, 1918 to present oral argument.
By the time the case was argued before the Supren1e Court, the
nominal parties, Fidelity Manufacturing and the Dagenharts, were
absent and only the Southern Cotton Manufacturers and the
been contending ... and asserted that the case was to be a landmark in
constitutional law.
/d.
146.

ld. at 105. In his oral opinion, Judge Boyd did not cite to precedent or
analyze previous cases. He issued an injunction against following the Keating-Owen
Act in the Western District of North Carolina. Judge Boyd simplified the issue: "Can
Congress do by indirection that which it undoubtedly cannot do directly?" /d. at 105106.
147.

148.

Wood, supra n. 48, at 105-106.
/d. at 105.
/d. at 106.
/d.

149.
150.
15 1.
152.
153.

Id at I 07.
/d. at 108.
ld.

)54.

/d.
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Department of Justice remained to prepare and argue the case. The
briefs had presented well-rehearsed legal arguments and well known
precedent. The government stressed Brandeis Brief facts, focusing on
155
It described, for
the health detriments of premature child work.
example, the alarming percentage of tuberculosis deaths in cotton
mills:
... Operatives, thus, of the most youthful age group were
four times, those of the post puberty were twice, and those
of the young adult group - 20 to 24 - were about two and a
half times as liable to die from tuberculosis as were,
respectively, the girls of like age that did not work in cotton
156
mills.
Evidence of loss of education, increases in crime and other ills
resulting from youth employment were advanced to support Congress'
57
legitimate legislative purpose of protecting public health_l
The
government's brief also focused on the inability of states to regulate
child labor on their own because of the opportunity of employers
se~king chea~ wages to flee to states _with li~t~e or no regulation of
1 8
chtld labor.
These employer actions utthzed the channels of
159
commerce for unfair competition.
In addition, the government, contrary to Parkinson's concession
in the District Court, argued that recent constitutional precedent clearly
supported Congress' power to enact the Keating-Owen Act. Champion
v. Ames, in 1903, bad upheld a similar federal statute prohibiting
interstate shipment of lottery tickets, reiecting both Commerce Clause
60
and Tenth Amendment challenges.
Other federal statutes
prohibiting transportatio_n of women across state lines for immoral

) 55.
See id. at 145.
156.
Br. for Appellant at 12-13, Hammer, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) in Landmark Briefs
of the United States Supreme Court: Constitutional Law Vol. 18 (Philip B. Kurland &
Gerhard Kasper, eds., U. Pub. of Am. 1975) [hereinafter Br. for Appellants]. Even in
relatively nonhazardous occupations, "the [tuberculosis] rate for the child is more than
double for the older worker." /d. at 13 (citing Sen. Rpt. 64-358 at 14 (1916)).
157.
/d.
158.
/d. at 23-35.
159.
/d. at 30-35.
160.
188 U.S. 321, 354-357 (1903) (holding "lottery tickets are subjects of
commerce and regulation of the carriage of such tickets ... is a regulation of
commerce").
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162

purposes
and regulating shipping of adulterated food and drugs
were also arguably supportive of Congress' power. State statutes
limiting child labor had been upheld against Fourteenth Amendment
challenges because of overriding health and safety concerns and the
163
Fifth Amendment attacks should fare no better.
164
The Southern Cotton Manufacturers' brief
nominally filed on
behalf of the Dagenharts concentrated on two constitutional themes
to which the Court of that period was extraordinarily receptive: fear
that overweening federal legislative power would eclipse the rightful
role of state and local governments, and protection of the rights of
parents over the upbringing and labor of their children. In the
65
background lurked the issue of race!
If Congress could
constitutionally control child labor, what could prevent it from
166
dismantling state-created racial segregation,
repeatedly upheld by
167
the Supreme Court?
Each of these rhetorical gambits played
important roles in the ultimate decision in Hammer. They pushed the

161. Hoke v. U.S. , 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913).
162. Hipolite Egg Co. v. U.S., 220 U.S. 45, 51 (1911 ).
163. Br. for Appellants at 40-48.
164. See generally Br. for Appellees at 1, 1-62, Hammer, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) in
Landmark Briefs of the United States Supreme Court: Constitutional Law Vol. 18
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Kasper, eds., U. Pub. of Am. I 975) [hereinafter Br. for
Appellees].
165.
ld. at 13-14,40 42.
/d. at 40. The brief noted that if national interest and consumer sensitivity
166.
became the basis for power for Congress to act, it could then act in a variety of issues
thought to be "national evils" by many people.
It is abhorrent to many people that negroes should not have the same
industrial opportunities that whites enjoy; therefore Congress may provide
that no factory which refuses to employ negroes, side by side with whites,
may ship its goods in interstate commerce ... It is hard to distinguish between
the fanciful idea of supersensitive consumers ... and the cases in which
Congress should conclude that it was abhorrent to the moral sense of the
community to have people engaging in interstate commerce from a State
which did not permit woman suffrage ... or did not permit the sale of liquor...
/d.

167.
See e.g. Cumming v. Bd. of Educ. , 115 U.S. 528, 545 (1899) (local authorities
have discretion in allocating funds between black and white schools); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-552 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of racially
segregated facilities); The Civil Rights Cases, I 09 U.S. 3, 17-19 ( 1883) (striking down
federal civil rights statutes): U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643-644 (1882) (Congress
lacked power to make the lynching of black prisoners held by state deputy sheriff a
federal crime).
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majority of the Court to distinguish prior precedent, which seemed to
control the case, and launch a series of confrontations with Congress
t~at only ended with the Court's 1937 "switch in time which saved
16
ntne." 8'
The Southern Cotton Manufacturers' brief concentrated on the
structural constitutional division of powers between national and state
governments. It noted, ostensibly paradoxically, that almost all states
had, in their own fashion, dealt effectively with the issue of child labor,
169
National regulation on the topic could not take
a necessary evi1.
account of the "infinite variations . of climatic, social and other
170
Included in these "infinite
conditions" in the United States.
variations" were the differing ages children mature in different
171
how "negros'' reached physical maturity at an earlier age than
states;
172
whites;
and how different parts of the country have different cultural
attitudes towards factory work for women and children. The KeatingOwen ~ct was thus a fed_eral attem~t to average the climate, wealth,
1 3
and ractal customs of varytng states.
The Southern Cotton Manufacturers' brief also argued that if
Congress could proscribe child labor conditions, what constitutional
barrier was there to regulation of minimal wages for adults, or federal
legislation affording the same job opportunities for ''negros'' and
174
Validation of congressional power over working conditions
whites?
of children would lead to the ''complete elimination of the States as
175
only the High Court could restrain Congressional
political entities";
176
subversion of our Constitutional structure.

168. Chemerinsky, supra n. 87, at 256.
169. Br. for Appellees, supra n. 164, at I0. "Not only have states passed statutes
addressing child labor, but in many of them there have been progressive steps taken to
protect the health; vigor, and safety of the coming generation". I d.
170. /d. at 9.
171. /d. The brief discussed, for example, how Louisiana statutes allowed children
to marry at age twelve but many other states forbade marriage until later ages. /d.
172. /d.
173. /d. at 13.
174. /d. at 40.
175. /d. at 14.
176. See id. at 61-62.
[B]ut for the FederaJ Government to attempt to create a privileged class of
citizens of the States who may engage in interstate commerce, or whose
products may be embarked in interstate commerce, involving, as this does,
the creation of another class, of whose conduct Congress does not approve,
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A second major theme of the Southern Cotton Manufacturers'
brief was protection of parental decision- making over children,
177
enshrined in the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.
This was
another important constitutional theme of the Court in the 1920s,
178
explaining a number of key decisions.
This argument was paired
with the specter of poverty-stricken families unable to use their
childrens' earnings even in the most dire economic conditions. The
brief noted that Roland Dagenhart was "a man of small means with a
large family" for whom "the compensation arising from the service of
each of said minor sons was essential for the comfort and maintenance
179
of the family, including said minors."
In addition, the appellees
noted the disagreement and conflicting arguments the Government had
180
presented at the District Court.
At the oral argument in Hammer the courtroom was packed with
legal and business notables, already in Washington to participate in the
181
war effort. All recognized the importance of the case.
Solicitor
General John W. Davis began the oral argument late in the day on
which is denied those privileges, is beyond the limits of the fundamental
principles of liberty and justice, and not in accordance with the nature of the
Federal State . . . If our institutions mean anything, and our Constitution is
more than a scrap of paper, the statement of that suggestion [Congressional
subversion of our Constitutional structure] carries its own refutation.
/d.
177. /d.
178.
I am indebted to Professor Barbara Bennet Woodhouse for this insight. See
generally Woodhouse, supra n. 53, at 1113-1117, 1068-1085. "By constitutionalizing
a patriarchal notion of parental rights, Meyer and Pierce interrupted the trend of family
law moving towards children's rights and revitalized the notion of rights of
possession." /d. at 11 13.
179. Br. for AppeJlees, supra n. 164, at 3.
180. Id. at 23~24.
"In the court below, eminent counsel for the defendant-appellant were in
disagreement as to the theory upon which this statute was to be
defended ... One counsel seemed to concede that before commerce in a given
article could be prohibited ... there must be an evil involved in, or arising out
of, the commerce .. .The other counsel ... disagreed with this view, because he
thought it valid and proper for Congress to regulate the prior conduct of the
persons who desire to engage in interstate commerce ... He represented the
group who frank I y believe that in this power to regulate commerce there
resides in Congress a method of regulating the entire conduct of the modern
man."
/d.
181. Wood, supra n. 48, at 151.
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April 15, 1918, continuing his presentation early the following day.
Davis immediately drew heated judicial responses to his contention
that "underlying this statute is the conviction that child labor is always
and everywhere inherently an evil thing and .all statutes are a reflection
183
of prevailing opinion in the public mind."
Davis, who had in the
past been called the "fair haired boy who could do no wrong in front of
the Court," was forced to repeatedly defend his assertion that legal
doctrine made permissible what dominant opinion justifiably
184
demanded.
The Cotton Manufacturers' arguments, presented by attorneys
Morgan J. O'Brien and William Hendren, failed to generate the same
185
interest from the Justices.
However, Chief Justice White repeatedly
inquired whether Congress had, in passing the Thirteenth Amendment,
assumed responsibility for the maintenance of a "virile citizenship,''
i.e., a healthy and informed citizenry, thus leading to the purpose and
186
need for the Keating-Owen Act.
Solicitor General Davis saw this as
187
evidence of a favorable outcome for the Government.
In this
instance, Davis misinterpreted the Chief Justice's interest, and the
confidence that he and the child labor refortners felt after oral argument
was shortly to be proven wrong.
The Supreme Court's five to four decision, on June 3, 1918, dealt
a fatal blow to congressional restrictions on child labor. The majority
opinion distinguished prior legitimation of federal statutes on the basis
that "the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the
accomplishment of harmful results [in those cases] ... [t]his element is
188
wanting in the present case.''
The Keating-Owen Act breached
Congress' constitutional boundary in two ways: "[i]t not only
transcends the authority delegated to Congress over commerce but also
exerts a power as to a purely local matter to which the federal authority
189
does not extend."
To allow this regulation would open the door to a
182.
ld.
183.
ld. at 152. Davis believed that in order for the Govemment to win, the
Justices needed education in the facts and statistics of child labor, rather than in the
relevant legal principles, which many on the bench had themselves written. /d. at 145.
/d. at 152.
184.
185.
ld.
186.
/d.
187.
ld.
188.
Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271.
189.. /d. at 276. Approval of the Keating-Owen Act might bring federal control
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host of unconstitutional usurpations, including the fixing of wages and
190
control over children.
The majority opinion tracked Judge Boyd's and the Southern
Cotton Manufacturers' arguments. While there could be "limitations
upon the right to employ children in mines and factories in the interest
of their own and the public welfare" only the states could exercise that
191
Here the majority, in good Asian martial arts manner, used
power.
the Progressives' legislative success in passing state restrictions on
child labor as a weapon against the exercise of power by Congress. In
concluding, the majority sounded an apocalyptical note. "[I]f Congress
can thus regulate matters entrusted to local authority ... all freedom of
commerce will be at an end, and the power of the states over local
matters may be eliminated, and our system of government be
192
practically destroyed."
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes penned an eloquent dissent.
States were free to act on child labor, but the Keating-Owen Act did
193
But states' regulation
not preempt any state's efforts on this topic.
of child labor was ineffective precisely because of the disability placed
upon them by competition from other states and their parochial
interests. Congress' commerce power was unqualified under the
19
Constitution and the legislature, ~ not the Court, was best able to
determine what type of regulation of child labor was in the nation's
195
best interest.
[I]f there is any matter upon which civilized countries have
agreed ... it is the evil of premature and excessive child

over matters that were uniquely subject, under the Tenth Amendment, to the state
police power and diminish the state's ability to exercise a unique relationship with
children. /d.
190. /d.
191.
ld. at 275.
192.
ld. at 276.
193. I d. at 281 (Holmes, J ., dissenting). States were undoubtedly within their
power to "regulate their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they like." /d.
194.
/d. at 280-281 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Although states could regulate their
own domestic commerce, "when they seek to send their products across the state line
they are no longer within their rights." /d .
195.
/d. at 277-278 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes' dissent also focused on the
many instances where the Court had upheld regulations passed under the Commerce
Clause for reasons indistinguishable from the majority's rationale. "Congress's power
to regulate commerce was unqualified under the Constitution ...." /d.
•
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labor. I should have thought that if we were to introduce our
own moral conceptions wherein in my opinion they do not
belong, this is preeminently a case for upholding the
196
exercise of all of its powers by the United States.
Later, when asked about his "victory" in the Supreme Court, Rueben
Dagenhart, now twenty, retorted:
We got some automobile rides. They bought both of us a
Coca-Cola. That's what we got out of it' he told an
interviewer. Look at me! A hundred and five pounds, a
grown man and no education. I may be mistaken, but I
think the years I've put in the cotton mills have stunted my
growth. They kept me from getting any schooling. I had to
stop school after the third grade and now I need the
education I didn't get. It would have been a good thing in
197
this state if that law they passed had been kept.
1.

Impact of the Decision
198

Before being explicitly overruled in 1941,
Hammer v.
Dagenhart, exerted an important influence on state and federal
decisions, including those by the Supreme Court. Hammer was relied
upon by federal circuit and district courts to invalidate a number of
important federal statutes. These courts used Hammer to hold that
Congress could not regulate various subjects because they were
reserved to the states and were not "commerce" for the purposes of the
Commerce Clause. In addition to lower courts, multiple Supreme
199
In all,
Court cases cited the decision between 1.918 and 1937.
Hammer was cited by 151 state and federal cases between 1918 and
200
1937.
196.
ld. at 280.
197.
Hindman, supra n. 41, at 68.
198.
See U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941).
199.
See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936); U.S. v.
Chi., M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 282 U.S. 311,324 (1931); Nigro v. U.S., 276 U.S. 332,339
(1928); U.S. v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 362 (1926); Brooks v. U.S., 267 U.S. 432,
438 (1925); United Leather Workers' Inti Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265
U.S. 457, 465 (1924); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S.
344, 408 ( 1922).
200.
Results obtained through Westlaw by retrieving the citation for Hammer v.
Dagenhart and accessing the "citing references" tooL The citing references were
limited by West1aw' s "limit" tool to court decisions of all jurisdictions issued between
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In 1934, for example, the District Court of Maryland held the
201
The defendant
National Industrial Recovery Act unenforceable.
argued that the Act was inapplicable because he did not engage in
202
interstate commerce.
The court cited Hammer as the "only
necessary obstacle" to a broader conce tion of using the commerce
another important federal statute, the Public Utility Holding Act,
204
unconstitutional.
In other illustrative examples, the Eastern and Western District
Courts of Missouri relied upon Hammer to find that Congress could not
205
In United States v. National
regulate manufacturing activities.
206
Garment,
the court supported its conclusion that the means of
production were constitutionally reserved for state regulation by
201
A similar approach was taken in
quoting extensively from Hammer.
Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co. v. Nee involving the Bituminous Coal
208
Conservation Act.
1918-1937.
201.
U.S. v. Mills, 7 F. Supp. 547,559 (D. Md. 1934), dismissed, 77 F.2d 1019 (4th
Cir. 1985) (by agreement of counsel).
202.
/d. at 559.
203.
/d. at 549. The court stated that the government's argument to expand the
Commerce Clause would require overruling Hammer. /d. Also in J934, the Southern
District of Illinois held that Congress could not regulate "filled milk" because it could
not override states' judgments. U.S. v. Carotene Prod. Co., 7 F. Supp. 500, 506 (S.D.
111. 1934). The court quoted Hammer at length because it showed the Supreme Court
"endeavoring to protect the states." /d. at 504. Carotene Products involved "the
precise principle which were (sic) discussed and applied by the Supreme Court" in
Hammer. /d. at 507.
In re Am. States, 1.2 F. Supp. 667, 699 (Md. 1935). The court described
204.
Hammer as deciding "constitutional provisions, (that] whether operating by way of
grant or limitation, are not to be evaded by legislation which, although not in terms
trespassing upon the letter and spirit, yet in substance or effect destroys, the grant or
limitation." In reaching its decision, the court quoted extensively from Hammer and
Bailey v. Drexel.
205.
U.S. v. Natl. Garment Co., 10 F. Supp. 104, 106 (E. D. Mo. 1935); HumeSinc/air Coal Mining Co. v. Nee, 12 F. Supp. 801, 804 (W.O. Mo. 1935).
206.
Nat!. Garment, 10 F. Supp. at 108.
/d.
207.
208.
Hume-Sinclair, 12 F. Supp. at 804-805 (also discussing the Child Labor Tax
cases). See also St. wuis-S.F. Ry. Co. v. Conly, 241 S.W. 365, 367 (Ark. 1922)
(holding the federa1 government could not "in any manner trench upon or dislodge the
police power of the states over their own local and internal affairs which are reserved
to them under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution").
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Bailey v. Drexel Furniture

After their defeat in Hammer, the NCLC and the Children's
Bureau sought to use Congress' power to tax, rather than the
209
delegitimized commerce power, to restrict youth e_mployment.
Child labor reformers in Congress turned to a different line of
promising Supreme Court precedent, particularly McCray v. U.S. in
10
1904.? In McCray Justice White held that the Court was barred from
21 1
White, of
inquiring into the motives of Congress in tax matters.
-c ourse, had been in the-majority in the five to four Hammer decision
and thus might be swayed to uphold a child labor tax.
No
congressional hearings were held before passage of the 1918 Tax
212
which included a 10% excise tax on the net profits of
Revenue Act,
businesses using prohibited child labor, defined in the same terms as
213
The Tax Revenue
those used in the invalidated Keating-Owen Act.
Act also empowered the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
209.
The months after the Dagenhart decision were tumultuous for child labor
reformers. Some wanted to await a shift in the Court's view of federa1ism before
attempting federa1 legislation again. Others contemplated ways to circumscribe
judicial review and diminish the Court's power or some advocated for a constitutional
amendment. Senator Kenyon considered a bill that used the congressional powers over
mail to regulate child labor. See Wood, supra n.48, at 188-193.
210.
McCray, 195 U.S. 27.
211.
In McCray the Court upheld a federal tax levied on margarine products, a
victory for producers of competing spreads and Congress' power under Article I, § 8,
Clause 1. Justice White noted:
App1ying this rule to the acts assailed, it is self-evident that on their face they
levy an excise tax. That being their necessary scope and operation, it follows
that the acts are within the grant of power. The argument to the contrary
rests on the proposition that, although the tax be within the power, as
enforcing it will destroy or restrict the manufacture of artificially colored
oleomargarine, therefore the power to levy the tax did not obtain. This,
however, is but to say that the question of power depends, not on the
authority conferred by the Constitution, but upon what may be the
consequence arising from the exercise of lawful authority.
/d. at 59.
212. Wood, supra n. 48, at 196.
213.
Keating-Owen Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 249, 39 Stat. 675 ( 1916), invalidated,
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 25 f ( 1918). The language of the Keating-Owen Act
was mirrored in the 1918 Tax Revenue Act, further fueling opposition arguments that
the Tax Act was not intended for tax revenue purposes, but to regulate manufacturing
prohibited by the Hammer decision. Compare Keating-Owen Act of 1916, Pub. L. No.
249,39 Stat. 675 (1916), invalidated, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) with
the 1918 Tax Revenue Act, Ch. 18, Title XII, 40 Stat. 1057 ( 1919), invalidated, Bailey
v. Drexel, 259 U.S. 20 ( 1922).
'

.

.
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to inspect facilities to ensure employer compliance with the terms of
214
the Act.
Reformers believed that the High Court could not overturn
the Tax Revenue Act without reversing McCray.
Even before the tax was enacted, Clark mobilized the Southern
Cotton Manufacturers to challenge it. The strategy, as before, was to
use a father and son as plaintiffs in a suit, again before District Judge
Boyd. After another search in the Western District of North Carolina,
Clark solicited Eugene T. Johnston, an emplo ee at the Atherton
W. Johnston, then fifteen, would have had his hours reduced, Johnston
217
agreed.
On May 2, 1919, Johnston v. Atherton Mills was heard
before Judge Boyd, argued by Clark's coworate lawyers fresh from
21
their success in Hammer v. Dagenhart.
The issue was decided
almost before the case began. Immediately after the plaintiffs' attorney
219
commenced his opening statement,
Judge Boyd announced that the
statute was unconstitutional, and that no further argument was
necessa . Congress was once more infringing upon the rights of the
221

was solely in favor of the Johnstons.
Given the narrowness of the order, the U.S. District Attorney
chose not to pursue the case further. Clark and the Southern Cotton
Manufacturers had been counting. on the Government to appeal the
case, and when it failed to do so, Clark brought Atherton Mills back
before Judge Boyd to file an appeal to the Supreme Court. Clark's
attorneys now argued that Atherton had the right to fire John Johnston
222
because of the 1918 Tax Revenue Act.
When the Supreme Court
214.
Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 276, 1200,40 Stat. 1057, 1203 (1919).
215.
Atherton Mi11s was one of the many mills owned by D.A. Tomkins, another
opponent of child reform efforts both in North Caro1ina and nationally. Tompkins was
well known for speeches maintaining that over-indulgence and slothfulness contributed
as much harm to children as child labor. He also campaigned aggressively in North
Carolina to allow lower ages for working children operating in an apprenticeship
capacity. See Hindman, supra n. 41, at 55, and Davidson, supra n. 92, at 157.
216.
See Hindman, supra n. 41, at 70.
217.
/d.
218.
Wood, supra n. 48, at 221.
219.
/d. at 229.
220.
/d. at 228 (citing Transcript of Record at 12, Atherton v. Johnston (April 23,
1919)).
22 J.
/d. at 221.
222.
See id. at 230.
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agreed to hear the appeal, Atherton invited the Department of Justice to
223
defend the constitutionality of the child labor tax, which it did.
Ath,erton Mills v. Johnston was argued at the Supreme Court on
224
December 10, 1919.
There is no record of the oral argument. By
this time, however, John Johnston had turned sixteen and the
controversy seemed moot. By 1920, with still no ruling, both sides
were becoming nervous. Clark had hoped for an early decision
because by April 1920 mills were required to file tax returns admitting
225
or denying liability for the 10% child labor tax.
Still there was
silence from the High Court.
The reason for the delay in Johnston has never been determined.
Some have speculated that Chief Justice White was the reason for the
lack of a decision. For White the issues of the case straddled a
doctrinal fence: the government's heavy reliance in its brief upon his
opinion in McCray meant either finding differences between that case
and Johnston in order to overturn the 1918 Tax Revenue Act, or
226
reversing his own decision of two decades earlier.
White, moreover,
227
was in rapidly failing health.
Finally, as the parties studied the poor financial results from two
228
in the spring of 1921,
years of enforcement of the Tax Revenue Act,
the High Court ordered re-argument for the following October~ Only
weeks into newly-elected President Warren Harding's term, Chief
Justice White died on May 19, 1921. His replacement was former
President William Howard Taft. From his past writings and
229
speeches,
Clark and the Southern Cotton Manufacturers were
223. /d. at 231.
224. Atherton Mills v. Johnson, 259 U.S. 13 (1922).
225.
See Hindman, supra n. 41, at 71.
226.
Wood, supra n. 48, at 242.
227.
/d. at 241.
228. The Bureau of Internal Revenue had allocated $90,000 for enforcing the Act in
its first year of operation. In that first year, however, it only collected $2,000 in fines.
Wood, supra n. 48, at 253.
By the time the Supreme Court ruled the Act
unconstitutional three years later, the tax had cost over $300,000 to administer, while
raising approximately $41 ,000 in revenue. The National Committee of Child Labor
noted these disappointing results, and was especially worried about the problems the
discrepancy would cause. Hindman, supra 11. 41, at 72.
229.
See Br. for Appellees, supra n. 164 at 57. The Southern Cotton
Manufacturers' lawyers quoted President Wilson's compilation of "Lectures on
Popular Government'; published in 191 3:
If the power to regulate commerce between the states can be stretched to

2010]

AMERICAN CHILD LABOR LAW BECAME A CON GAME

129

confident Taft was a reliable fifth vote in their favor. In the fall of
1921 the Johnston case was argued for a second time, but now was
joined by two other cases manufactured by the mill owners and decided
230
231
and Bailey v. Drexel.
by Judge Boyd, Vivian Mills v. J. W. Bailey
These new cases had interesting litigation histories. Clark and his
counsel had been deeply concerned about the jurisdictional deficiencies
of their Johnston test case, so they had again scoured the Western
232
District for a cotton mill that had resisted the 10% tax penalty.
233
Finding none, Clark turned to other manufacturers for a test case.
He utilized a list obtained from the Internal Revenue in Raleigh, North
Carolina, listing manufacturers recently assessed the 10% penalty
234
Meanwhile his lawyers, Manly and Hendren,
under the Tax Act.
wrote President Harding's new Solicitor General, James M. Beck,
suggesting the Johnston case be delayed due to the "probability of a
case being docketed during the early months of the term which will be
235
free from any question of jurisdiction."
Beck, eager to decide the
236
constitutional issue, agreed.
In October of 1921 Clark's lawyers assisted the Drexel Furniture
Company in submitting a petition for a tax refund and initiating another
237
To expedite the case, U.S. Solicitor
federal suit before Judge Boyd.
General Beck instructed the new District Attorney for Western North
Carolina, F.A. Linney, to file a demurrer, asserting the child labor tax
was constitutional. On December 10, 1921, the case was heard in
North Carolina's Western District Court. Unsurprisingly, Judge Boyd
once more immediately ruled against the government.
Breaking with his past practice of orally rendering opinions from
the bench, this time Boyd drafted an opinion. He ignored the Supreme

include the regulation of labor in mills and factories, it can be made to
embrace every particular of the industrial organization and action of the
country... . . May Congress also regulate the conditions under which
merchandise is produced? Clearly not.
/d.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See Hindman, supra n. 41, at 72.
/d.
Wood, supra n. 48, at 260.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 261.

/d.
/d. at 264.
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Court precedent in McCray,
holding that "the necessary result of the
statute must be taken into consideration, even if that result is not in so
many words either enacted or distinctly provided for. In whatever
language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by
239
its natural and reasonable effect."
Relying on his Summer 1921
240
decision in George v. Bailey and ignoring Supreme Court precedent
that held a federal suit could not be entertained to restrain a tax, Judge
Boyd re-asserted that states were the only entities able to address child
labor:
By comparing the federal and state statutes it will be readily
seen that the latter affords as much protection to the health
and physical condition of children as the former ... [i]nstead
of undertaking as the federal act, to make the income of an
establishment using child labor illegally, the subject of
taxation, it denounces as a criminal offense the violation of
its provisions ...
[F]or this reason the state statute is undoubtedly more
capable of prompt execution than the act of Congress, and
the expenses incident to it when compared to that of the
241
federal plan, must necessarily be a great dealless.
In this Bailey v. Drexel decision all the interested parties the
Government as well as Clark and his Textile Manufacturers now had
a viable case to ensure the High Court would address the
constitutionality of the 1918 Tax Revenue Act.
238.
See supra nn. 210-211 and accompanying text.
239.
Drexel Furniture Co. v. Bailey, 216 F. 452, 454 (W.D. N.C. 1921).
240.
George v. Bailey, 214 F. 639, 644 (W.D. N.C. 1921). This case is also known
as the Vivian Cotton Mill or Vivian Spinning Mill case. Its convoluted facts did not
make it an attractive test scenario for Clark's lawyers. In 1919, while operating under
the name of Vivian Cotton Mills, the Internal Revenue of North Carolina assessed the
owner, Mr. George a $2,098 fine for illegally employing children. Attempting to rid
himself of this liability, the ownership of the company was transferred to a new entity,
the Vivian Spinning Mills. The North Carolina Tax Collector, Bailey, demanded the
money and threatened to seize the property and dispose of it by sale. The Mill filed a
lawsuit, requesting that Bailey be enjoined from acting because the Child Labor Tax
was unconstitutional under the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. The Supreme Court had
previously held in McCray, 195 U.S. at 54 (1904), that no federal suits could be
entertained to restrain a tax; rather reimbursement must be sought. Judge Boyd waived
this "technicality" to issue an injunction against Bailey. George, 247 F. at 642; see
Wood., supra n. 48, at 265-266.
241.
George, 214 F. at 643.
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At the March 8, 1922, oral argument in the Supreme Court in
Bailey v. Drexel, Solicitor General Beck was subjected to repeated hard
questioning, forced to defend the discrepanc~ between the cost of
242
administering the tax versus its small income.
Chief Justice Taft
was particularly hostile, demanding that Beck explain how the Court
should determine congressional intent for the statute and the limits of
243
federal regulatory authority over production in the states.
Most
observers felt the argument went badly for the Government and Beck
himself acknowledged this in a letter to Chief Justice Taft after the
244
Child labor reformers were already suspicious of Beck's
decision.
commitment and advocacy efforts. Weeks before his argument to the
Supreme Court, Beck told the St. Louis Bar Association that he heartily
approved of the Dagenhart decision, and believed that if courts
continued to sustain congressional taxation without inquiry into motive
245
"little will be left of the rights of the State."
The Court's final blow came on May 15, 1922. Bailey v.
246
George
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust
all grounds for equitable relief. The Johnston case was determined to
247
be moot,
but in Drexel v. Bailey the Court ruled the Child Labor Tax
249
248
Chief Justice Taft, notoriously pro-business,
unconstitutional.
found that the law represented a penalty, not a tax, and thus the Court
250
was not inquiring into Congress' motives:
242.
243.
244.

Wood, supra n. 48, at 273.
ld.
/d. at 274. Beck later wrote Taft:
[Y]ou may be surprised to know that, although I presented the Government's
contention in the Child Labor Case as strongly as I was able, yet none who
heard you deliver the opinion may have welcomed the decision more than I.
Had the Court adhered tenaciously to the views of the late Chief Justice
White in McCray v. United States, our form of government would have
sustained a serious injury.

/d.

245.

Wood, supra n. 48, at 269.

246.

Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16, 20 (1922).

247.
248.

Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13, 16 ( 1922).
Bailey v. Drexel, 259 U.S. 20, 44 ( 1922).

Taft was notoriously pro-business as a Justice and politician. See Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., The Federalist Capers, Legal Affairs,
http://www .Iega1affairs.org/printerfriend1y .msp?id=820 (accessed Feb. 6, 2011 ).
250.
Bailey, 259 U.S. at 36. "But there comes a time in the extension of the
penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes
a mere penalty, with the characteristics of regulation and punishment. . . . The case
249.
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[G]rant the validity of this law and all that Congress would
need to do hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control
any one of the. great number of subjects of public
interest ... would be to enact a detailed measure of complete
regulation of the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax
upon departures from it. 251
Justices Brandeis and Holmes acquiesced in the majority's
opinion~ much to the surprise of child labor opponents. Justice Clarke
252
Congress' taxing power was now
dissented without an opinion.
equally as impotent as its commerce power to legitimate federal
legislation on child labor.

IV.
A.

FEDERAL ACTIVITY IN THE

1920'S AND 1930'S

The Twentieth Amendment

Few today, other than professional historians, know about the
intense struggle that raged during the 1920s and 1930s, ultimately
unsuccessful, to pass a constitutional amendment giving Congress and
the states power to limit or prohibit child labor under the age of
eighteen. Similar to the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment in the
1970s and 1980s, the failure to pass a constitutional amendment
marked a significant setback for a set of ideas and the grou s
joined by some Catholics, were able to frame the debate in terms thatdivorced from the realities of child labor resonated with many voters
and political representatives. To its opponents, the proposed Twentieth
Amendment was an assault on parental authority, states' rights and
· traditional American values.

before us cannot be distinguished from that of Hammer v. Dagenhart." /d. at 37-39.
251.
Id. at 38.
252.
/d. at 44.
253.
The opposition included women's groups that had opposed the Nineteenth
Amendment grant of suffrage to women, e.g., Sentinels of the Republic, The Woman
Patriots, and other conservative organizations, such as the National Association of
Manufacturers, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and some American Catholics.
See Riva Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 947-948 (2002). See generally
Bill Kauffman, The Child Labor Amendment Debate of the 1920s; or, Catholics and
Mugwumps and Farmers, IO J. Libertarian Stud. 139, 152 (1992) (describing
federalism and states' rights issues in the consideration of the Twentieth Amendment).
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With the Supreme Court blocking any congressional statute, a
constitutional amendment was the only possible path for federal
intervention on child labor. Samuel Gompers, President of the
American Federation of Labor (AFL), noted that "the Supreme Court
deals with childhood exactly as it would deal with pig iron ... [A]
254
constitutional amendment is needed to complete the work quickly."
This idea had been previously floated; meetings had been held at AFL
headquarters between Gompers, Florence Kelly of the National
Consumers League, representatives of the National Child Labor
255
Ultimately, the proposed
Committee and others to discuss wording.
amendment read:
Section 1. The Congress shall have power to limit,
regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen
years of age.
Section 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired
by this article, except that the operation of State laws shall
be suspended to the extent necessary to give effect to
256
legislation enacted by the Congress.
Two days after the decision in Bailey v. Drexel, Representative
Roy Fitzgerald of Ohio introduced a resolution in the House endorsing
257
The forces favoring the
the proposed constitutional amendment.
amendment initially seemed formidable; all three political partiesRepublican, Democratic and Progressive were officially in support.
The proposed amendment had endorsement across the political
spectrum, from conservatives like Massachusetts Republican Senator
258
NonHenry Cabot Lodge to Progressive Senator Robert LaFollette.
governmental groups like the National Child Labor Committee, the
National Consumer Union and others had already had ~reat legislative
59
success, in the states on child labor and allied issues.
Each 1924
260
presidential candidate supported the measure.
Proponents of the
254.
Samuel Gompers, Let Us Save the Children, 29 Am. Federationist 413, 413414(1922).
255.
Marvin Levine, Children for Hire: The Perils of Child Labor in the United
States 29 (Greenwood Publishing Group 2003).
256.
66 Cong. Rec. 3212 (1925).
257.
Trattner, supra n. 84, at 162.
258.
Kyvig, supra n. 80, at 257 ~
259.
See supra nn. 83- 91 and accompanying text.
260.
Novkov, supra n. 63, at 374.
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amendment were optimistic about the possibility for early ratification
and, indeed, the process in Congress was quick and decisive. By the
summer of 1924, both the. House (297-68) and the Senate (61-23) had
261
approved the measure.
Even at this early stage, however, it was clear that a powerful
opposition was forming and a grab bag of negative arguments being
collected that would ultimately doom the amendment. In hearings
before congressional committees, employer groups challenged the
appropriateness of federal action, arguing that regulation of child labor
was best left to the states- even though employers actively opposed
262
restrictions at that levet
Another rhetorical gambit, drawn from
common law principles, was the threat of loss of parental rights o.ver
263
children
to . a power-hungry, and, in the future, socialist/communist
gov:e rnment. The use of the phrase "labor of persons under
eighteen ... " in Section I of the proposed amendment, rather than
''employment" or "employment relations," provided fuel for a firestorm
of arguments that parental authority was about to be supplanted by
government and that children would no longer have the educational and
disciplinary benefits inherent in work.
'

The proposed amendment would give to Congress the power
to forbid any farn1 boy from milking a cow or even driving
in a cow from the pasture until he is eighteen years old.
Under its sweeping provisions it might and probably would
be made illegal for sister Suzie to wash a dish or sew on a
264
button until after her eighteenth birthday .
265

And while the Palmer raids and the Red Scare of 1919-1920
had
abated by the mid-1920s, fear of a left-wing takeover of the United

261.
lABOR: A 20th Amendment? Time Mag. (Jan. 5; 1925).
262.
Joan Aldous, The Political Process and the Failure of the Child lAbor
Amendment, 18 J. Fam. Issues 71,76 (1997).
263.
"The state has no jurisdiction over the child merely because it is a child, and
no earthly power can delegate such privilege to the state. The divine law, as we11 as the
invincible law of nature, prescribed the rights and duty of parent and chi1d centuries
before nations were known and governments fonnulated." 66 Cong. Rec. 3212 ( 1925)
(read from an article submitted by Senator King).
264.
Trattner, supra n. 84, at 284.
265.
The legal and political developments during the "Red Scare" are described in
Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime 220-226 (W. W. Norton &
Co. 2004).
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266

States remained strong,
and the proposed amendment was branded
267
as "communist. "
Not least among the opponents to the amendment were the
Sentinels of the Republic, the Women Patriots, and other groups that
had played a significant role in the campaign against suffrage for
women. These groups came together to resist what they saw as
268
attempts to attack the traditional American home and family.
Harriet Frothingham, a prominent Women's Patriots leader (and losing
269
plaintiff in Frothingham v. Mellon ) expressed her opposition to
proposed 1920s reforms as a triplet of socialist bills to cover education,
maternity and infancy, and child labor; " ... [T]he bills are different, but
the backers are always the same, with the same objective, nationalized
270
Equally as
care, control, and support of mothers and children."

266.
This was a period of American and European intervention in the civil war
going on in the former Tsarist Russian empire. The newly-emergent Bolshevik
Revolution was seen as a threat to the existing economic and political order throughout
Europe and North America.
William D. Guthrey called the amendment a
"communistic effort to nationalize children." WiHiam D. Guthrey, The Child Labor
Amendment: Argument in Opposition to Ratification 36 (1924), quoted in Woodhouse,
supra n. 53, at I 066.
267.
The Citizens Committee to Protect Our Homes and Children called the
Amendment a keystone in the Communist Program and the "brainchild" of Lenin's
mistress. In 1933, the President of the American Bar Association called it "a
communist effort to nationalize children ... " Kauffman, supra n. 253, at 140.
268.
See Mustering Sentinels of the Republic! Natl. Magazine (Oct. 1922)
(discussing leadership of the Sentinels of the Republic).
Cmmw. of Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 , 487 (1923) (taxpayer lacked
269.
standing to bring suit to enjoin federal statute providing funding to reduce maternal and
infant mortality).
270.
67 Cong. Rec. 12,919, 12,930 (1926). The Women's Patriots noted:
[it] has been shown that the "worst form of communism" as Senator
Kingwell calls it, is found in the feminist phase of communism arousing
women against men, wives against husbands and providing community care
for children, legitimate and illegitimate, to ''remove the economic
foundations of monogamous marriage.
/d. at 12,946. See generally Kauffman, supra n. 253 (describing issues of federalism
and states' rights in debates over the proposed amendment). The President of the
American Bar Association claimed that the Amendment was "a communistic effort to
nationalize children, making them primarily responsible to the government instead of
to their parents." /d. at 140. Congressman Fritz G. Lanham likewise mocked the
Amendment as enjoining children to "obey your agents from Washington, for this is
right. Honor thy father and thy mother, for the Government has created them but a
little lower than the Federal agent. Love, honor, and disobey them." Jeffrey A. Tucker,
The Trouble With Child Labor Laws, Mises Daily (Feb. 11, 2008).
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damaging to the campaign for enactment of the Child Labor
Amendment was opposition from Catholic Church organizations and
laypersons. Many in the clerical hierarchy and laity saw the proposal
271
as a threat to parochial education and parental control over children.
Despite quick and decisive approval of the amendment in
Congress, ratification efforts in the states quickly ran into a buzz saw
of opposition.
A few states ratified quickly, but a defeat in
Massachusetts proved decisive in 1924. Action in the Massachusetts
legislature was deferred to provide a vote in a referendum, allowing
opponents to organize effectively. In particular, the Catholic hierarchy
in Massachusetts vigorously opposed the amendment as a continuation
of initiatives in other states restricting parochial education and as an
272
expression of the power of the resurgent Klu Klux Klan (KKK).
Nor was the Massachusetts opposition simply composed of
Catholics. The President of Harvard, A. Lawrence Lowell, was active
in organizing ~stablis~ment Protestants t~ opEose Congress' authority
amendment as choking off the supply of child labor. ~ An even more
ominous development in the Massachusetts referendum campaign was,
for the first time in the history of the struggle to restrict child labor,
explicit resistance from the American Farm Bureau Federation and
275
other agricultural groups.
This reflected concern that child labor,
whether on small family farms or on the large corporate entities then
transforming American agriculture, would become unavailable~
Opposition from the agricultural interests was to prove critical in
276
numerous coming battles.
2

271.
Woodhouse, supta n. 53, at 1062.
272.
See Kauffman, supra n. 253, at 144. The KKK' s extreme anti-Catholic views
prevented New York Governor AI Smith from being nominated for President on the
Democratic ticket in 1924. The head of the Massachusetts Catholic Church, Cardinal
O;Connell, was particularly wary of federal power, fearing Congress could pass a law
subjecting schools and teachers to federal control and banning parochial schools.
Aldous, supra n. 262, at 82. In the run up to the 1924 Massachusetts referendum,
Cardinal O'Connell instructed all pastors in his archdiocese to read a pastoral letter
warning that the Child Labor Amendment would shift control over children to the
federal govemm.ent, reminiscent of Soviet Bolshevism. /d.
273.
Kauffman, supra n. 253, at 160.
274.
Aldous, supra n. 262, at 83.
275.
/d.
276.
Farm groups opposed the ratification effort in the states of the Child Labor
Amendment and later successfully lobbied against the inclusion of fann workers in
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The rhetoric of the anti-ratification campaign in Massachusetts
and the organization of opposition groups proved wildly successful.
The referendum resulted in a defeat by an almost three-to-one
277
majority .
Soon afterwards, New York's legislature tabled the
amendment and by early 1925, only four of the state legislatures where
the amendment was pending had approved it. The first wave of
ratification action had resulted in a crushing defeat. The Child Labor
Amendment was not to surface again until the depths of the Great
Depression.
B.

Developments in the Great Depression

With the nation mired in the greatest economic crisis of its
history, and the newly-elected President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
(FDR) promising a "New Deal," Congress assed the National
included re-employment of idle workers, creation of decent wages, and
prevention of ruinous and unfair competition. Child labor was viewed
279
Under
as a significant factor in each of these economic problems.
the NIRA, the President was authorized to approve "codes of fair
280
competition" that would further the "public interest."
The codes set
281
Most of the codes
rules on trade practices, prices, wages and hours.
prohibited children under eighteen from performing "hazardous work"
282
and set minimum age requirements.
The very first NIRA Code

protective New Deal labor statutes, such as the National Industria] Recovery Act, the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Social Security Act,
and others. See infra nn. 354-363 and accompanying text.
277.
Aldous, supra n. 262, at 76.
278.
Natl. Indus. Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 67, Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933).
279.
See Ella Arvilla Merritt, Trend of Child Labor, 1927-1936, Mthly. Lab. Rev.
1371, 1371 (Dec. 1937); see Margaret H. Schoenfeld, Analysis of the Labor Provisions
of the N.R.A. Codes, Mnthly. Lab. Rev. 574, 574 (Mar. 1935).
280.
Natl. Indus. Recovery Act, supra n. 278.
281.
Over 7,000 such codes for different industries were developed. Violations of
these negotiated codes constituted a criminal misdemeanor punishable by fine. /d.
282.
Kyvig, supra n. 80, at 307. By the end of 1933 more than I 00 codes had been
adopted; almost all banned employment under the age of sixteen. /d. at 308. The
NIRA was responsible for blocking I 00,000 child laborers under the age of sixteen
from the work force. When the statute was declared unconstitutional, those children
went back to work. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearings on S. 2475
and H.R. 7200 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and wbor and the House Comm. on
Labor, 75th Con g. 1483-85 ( 1937) (remarks of Hon. Francis Perkins, Secretary of
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banned employment of children under sixteen in cotton textile mills,
the_ venue for previous constitutional attacks on federal child labor
283
limits.
The Supreme Court, however, quickly moved to block many parts
of the New Deal, including restrictions on youth employment. On
"Black Monday," May 27, 1935, it declared the NIRA unconstitutional
284
in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S.
The child labor provisions
were not specifically at issue, but the High Court found the entire
statute ''attempted regulation of intrastate transactions" that affect
285
The Agricultural Adjustment
interstate commerce ''only indirectly."
286
Act of 1933 (AAA), as amended in 1934,
allowed the Secretary of
Agriculture to create child labor standards as a prerequisite to payment
of federal benefits to growers of beet and sugar cane, crops where child
labor was particularly omnipresent. The Court held that statute
281
unconstitutional in 1936 in U.S. v. Butler.
When the AAA was in
force, child labor in the sugar beet fields was sharply reduced, but after
the statute's invalidation, large numbers of children under fourteen
288
As a result of the High Court's decisions in 1935
returned to work.
there was a 55% increase from the previous year in employment of
fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds. Two and one-half times as many
children left school in 1936 to take low income jobs as in the previous
.

..

year.289

Labor).
283. The impact of the NIRA on the cotton mills, scene of the prior litigation on
the constitutionality of federal child labor restrictions was particularly noteworthy. See
supra n. 282 and accompanying text. See also Andrew J. Samset, Child Labor and the
New Millennium, 21 Whittier L .. Rev. 69, 75 ( 1999).
284. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495,521 (1935) (upholding
a Second Circuit decision that held unconstitutional wage and hours provisions
regulating the wholesale pou1try trade because Schechter's Market was not in interstate
commerce).
285.
/d. at 551. The court also found the Act was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the President because it provided no standards to be
administratively applied. ld.
286.
Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. Law No~ 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 ( 1933) (as
amended May 9, 1934, 48 Stat. 670).
U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (holding states have the power to
287.
regulate agriculture, and Congress could not indirect1y accomplish the AAA goals by
taxing and spending to purchase comp1iance on matters in excess of its Commerce
Clause powers)~
288.
Trattner, supra n. 84, at 210.
289.
George E. Paulsen, A Living Wagefor the Forgotten Man 61 (Susquehanna U.
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Judicial invalidation of New Deal laws, including restrictions of
child labor, helped to create a referendum on President Roosevelt's
policies in the 1936 national elections. The result was unequivocal;
Roosevelt received 523 electoral votes to eight for Alf Landon, and
290
Democratic control of Congress was strengthened.
Emboldened by
this national vote of confidence, FDR moved quickly after his second
inauguration in 1937. Roosevelt's "court packing plan" proposed
legislation to increase the size of the Supreme Court by one for each
291
sitting Justice over age seventy, up to a maximum of fifteen Justices.
The proposal, however, drew intense opposition, including from
Democrats concerned about the independence of the federal
292
It never came to a final congressional vote.
judiciary.
But, by the spring of 1937, Supreme Court decisions reflected
different views on a number of key constitutional issues. In West
293
Coast Hotels v. Parrish,
the Court approved a state statute requiring
minimum wages for women, a retreat from its prior position on state
protective labor legislation. The Supreme Court similarly u held the
the argument that it regulated manufacturing, a matter constitutionally
295
Since the
reserved to state authority by prior Court precedent.
manufacture of steel and other products was now deemed to be in the
"flow" of interstate commerce, it was evident that previous negative
96
rulings on Congress' statutory power to restrict child Iabo~ might be
overruled in future cases.
•

Press 1996).
290.
Marian C. McKenna, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Great Constitutional
War: The Court Packing Crisis of 1937 243 (Fordham U. Press, 2002). The 1936
election was the most lopsided electoral victory in the history of American presidential
contests. /d.
291.
Chemerinsky, supra n. 87, at 255-256.
292.
/d.
293.
See 300 U.S. 379, 386 ( 1937).
294.
See Jones v. Laughlin Steel Corp., 30 I U.S. 1, 47 ( 1937).
295.
See e.g. A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935)
(finding NIRA unconstitutional as violation of state control of Jocal industry); U.S. v.
E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) ("[c)ommerce succeeds to manufacture and is
not a part of it.")
296.
See e.g. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273.
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C.

TheFLSA

The country was, by 1937, overwhelmingly opposed to child
labor; public opinion polls showed a large majority in favor of the
297
Child Labor Amendment.
Reformers saw their opportunity and a
number of political-legal approaches were proposed. Some, in and out
of the administration, favored aggressively pushing for passage of the
Child Labor Amendment. Low wages, adult unemployment, depressed
consumer spending and massive child labor had created a new burst of
activity on the proposed Twentieth .A mendment in the 1930s; by 1937

twenty-eight states had ratified the amen_dment, leaving it Just _eight
299

298

30

short of passage.
Labor Secretary Perktns
and others
beheved
only this solution could ultimately solve the problem. These forces
believed child labor needed to be eliminated from both intrastate and
interstate employment, which could only be accomplished by a
constitutional amendment.
Other leaders endorsed the idea of a separate federal statute
dealing exclusively with youth workers to avoid the political
complexities created by the general wage and hour provisions, as well
301
as administrative issues arising from the proposed FLSA.
Senator

297.
Paulsen, supra n. 289, at 65. ~~Public opinion polls revealed that substantial
majorities favored national regulation of labor standards, with 68 percent favoring an
8-hour day, 63 percent supporting minimum wages, and 82 percent favoring a childlabor amendment." /d.
298.
Novkov, supra n. 63, at 395. Hold-outs included almost all of the south,
except for Kentucky and Arkansas~ /d.
299.
Paulsen, supra n. 289, at 86-87. At joint congressional hearings, Perkins
testified that the child labor prohibition in the proposed FLSA was commendable, but
she still favored the Child Labor Amendment. /d. Perkins asked Roosevelt to delete
the child labor ban from the comprehensive labor standards bill, but Roosevelt refused
in order to make the labor standards measure easier to get through Congress. /d. at 77.
300.
/d. at 90. Chief of the Children's Bureau, Katherine Lenroot, likewise
testified that since the NIRA' s invalidation the number of children working had risen
sharply and many were employed ·in intrastate industries. /d. Because any proposed
statutory prohibition would only cover a small number of working children she
continued to urge passage of the Child Labor Amendment. /d. AFL President William
Green, after commenting on conditions in New Jersey silk mills employing thirteenand fourteen-year-olds, said ratification of the Child Labor Amendtnent was the only
solution. /d. at 67.
30 I.
After an extensive question-and-answer session with Senator Black on
.

.

.

.

.

the FLSA, Senator Edwin Johnson (Colorado)

.

.

noted~

The real question before the Senate is: ShaH it consider the very important
chHd-labor problem in a separate bill. . . . Why should the Congress inject

.
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Barkley (D. Ky.) sponsored the Childrens' Bureau bill dealing solely
302
Others, however, including FDR himself, believed
with child labor.
that child labor issues should be part of the overall labor bill that
303
This was
ultimately became the Fair Labor Standards Act.
ultimately the strategy that prevailed.
The story of the battle to enact the general wage and hour
304
The child
provisions of the FLSA has been well-told elsewhere.
labor provisions were a side show in the general struggle for passage,
but decisions made during this battle have impacted the history of child
labor in the United States to this day. On May 24, 1937, President
Roosevelt recommended that Congress pass legislation establishing
national labor standards. In addition, Roosevelt noted, "a selfsupporting and self-respectin:ff democracy can plead no justification for
05
the existence of child labor."
That same day the FLSA was introduced by Senator (later
Supreme Court Justice) Hugo Black (D. Ala.) and Representative
Connery (D. Mass.). The bill provided for national regulation of

the regulation of child labor, which is relatively simple, into all the
complexities and uncertainties of the wage and hour bill? Is it possible that
child labor has been added to this wage and hour bill to obtain public
sympathy for a program over which there is great difference of opinion and
controversy .... [I]t is not fair ....

82 Cong Rec. 7633-68 (1937).
302.
Paulsen, supra n. 289, at 77.
303.
See generally Franklin D. Roosevelt et al., The Public Papers and Addresses
of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Constitution Prevails Vol. 6, 209-218 (The Macmillan
Co. 1941).
The reason the child labor section was included with the wage and hour
legislation instead of forming a separate act was because of the feeling that it
had a better chance to be declared constitutional as an integral part of general
legislation intended to remove the burden of unfair labor practices on the free
flow of interstate commerce. Alone, child labor may not be a very great
burden, but when considered with the other factors, it has a better chance of
surviving attack in the courts.
John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 L. &
Con temp. Probs. 464, 487 ( 1939).
304.
See generally Forsythe, supra n. 303; Paul H. Douglas & Joseph Hackman,
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1839, I, 53 Political Sci. Q. 491, 491-492 (1938)
(hereinafter Douglas & Hackman I].
305.
Roosevelt, supra n. 303, at 210-212 (citing the dissent in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, Roosevelt declared that the power of Congress over interstate commerce
gave it power over child labor).
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306

wages, hours and other conditions of employment
and banned
''oppressive child labor," i.e., employment of children under the age of
307
sixteen or between sixteen and eighteen in "hazardous occupations.-"
These youth employment provisions approximated the 1916 KeatingOwen Act and the
1919 Child Labor Excise Tax enactment.. The
.
congressional battle for passage of the FLSA was lengthy, lasting more
than a year and encompassing two regular, and one special, sessions of
Congress. It was also procedurally and politically extraordinarily
.

complex~

As the bill worked its way through the House ofRepresentatives,
308

the child labor sections varied.
The original provisions were
progressively weakened;: fourteen- and fifteen-year olds not working in
manufacturing and mininffi were now permitted to work except under
3 9
"oppressive" conditions.
This, of course, opened the door for
employment of under;-sixteen-year-olds until the present day. Sixteenand seventeen-year-olds were allowed to work in all but "particularly
310
hazardous" occupations.
Administration of the child labor
311
provisions was placed in the Children's Bureau.
Despite concessions on these and other issues, the House Rules
Committee, dominated by Southern Democrats and Republicans,
blocked consideration of the entire measure, preventing any action
during the first regular session of the 75th Congress. In response,
306. Douglas & Hackman I, supra n. 304, at 493-499 (The administration biJl
proposed to give a broad mand3;te to an Administrative Board with powers over labor
and management. It would set minimum wages, maximum hours, and a host of other
provisions. The Board was to be composed of five men appointed from civil-service
lists and confirmed by the Senate. The Board would appoint a director for each state.
Hearings were to be conducted locally. Before deterntining minimum wages and
maximum- hours the Board was required to receive advice from a committee
representing labor, industry and the public and also to provide notice and hearings for
interested parties. Criticism of this administrative approach included claims that it had
the broadest government authority granted; in peace-time, to a person(s) other than the
President).
.

307.
308.
309.

.

/d. at 504-506.
/d. at 497.
Section 203(1) of the Act allowed employment of fourteen- to sixteen-year-

olds if the Secretary of Labor determined such work was confined to periods which
Hwill not interfere with their schooling and to conditions which will not interfere with
their health and well-being." 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(1) (2010).
310.
Douglas & Hackman I, supra n. 304; at 497.
311.
Paul H. Douglas & Joseph Hackman, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
II, 54 Political Sci. Q. 29, 52 (1939) [hereinafter Douglas & Hackman II].
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President Roosevelt called a special session to begin November 15,
1937, but the bill was stalled there as well by the same conservative
312
coalition.
In the second regular session of the: 75th Congress, Roosevelt
agreed to significant changes in labor standards in an attempt to
313
The child labor provisions remained a
appease southern Democrats.
314
"sweetener" to help ensure passage of the Act.
In the end, the
critical events driving passage of the FLSA were probably more
explicitly political. Soon after the victory of two New Deal supporters
315
in Spring 1938 primaries,
a petition to discharge the bill from the
Rules Committee, where it had again been bottled up, obtained the
needed 218 signatures in less than three hours. Within a few weeks the
House voted 291 to 89 in favor of the FLSA, and it was passed by the
Senate without a record vote~
D.

The Impact of the FLSA on Child Labor

The impact of the FLSA's passage on the use of child labor,
however, was negligible. The Supreme Court itself quickly recognized
In Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
the Act's limited reach.
316
Lenroot,
it narrowly construed the statute to exclude transmission of
telegraph messages from the ban on a producer's shipment of ''goods"
in interstate commerce. The Court noted: "[s]o far as coverage was
concerned, all proponents were aware that any of the suggested
ve~sions of legislation would reach only a small fraction of existing
317
child labor."

312.
Douglas,& Hackman I, supra n. 304; at 508-511.
313.
/d. at 514-515.
314.
Felt, supra n. 28, at 474-475. The President believed he would "get more
votes from conservative Congressmen if the wage and hour provisions [were] ... made
more palatable by integration with child labor." /d. Senator Wheeler noted child labor
"was put on the bill ... because it was desired to say to senators, 'When you vote
against this bill your are also voting against the prohibition of child labor."' Id.
315.
Douglas & Hackman I, supra n. 304, at 511-512 (on January 4, 1938, in the
Alabama Democratic primary, Senator Lister Hill, a supporter of the FLSA and other
New Deal legislation, won a decisive two to one victory against the anti-New Deal
candidate. On May 3, 1938, Senator Claude Pepper, another pro-FLSA candidate,
handily defeated his opponent in Florida).
316.
323 U'.S. 490, 502-503 ( 1945).
317.
/d. at 495-496.
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Soon after passage of the FLSA, the_United States entered World
War II and even the limited child labor protections were eviscerated.
When a labor shortage emerged as males entered the armed services,
318
but youth were
women entered the work force in large nu,mbers
affected even more dramatically. According to the Department of
Labor (DOL), "[c]ontrary to general belief, the early withdrawal of
boys and girls from school was a greater factor in the expansion of the
319
labor force than was the increase in the number of women working."
Following the outbreak of the war, school enrollment fell by 24% for
fifteen- to eighteen-year-olds, while the number of fourteen- to
320
seventeen-year-aids employed increased by 200%.
By 1945, U.S~
Census samples showed approximately 3.5 million youths employed
321
full- or part-time, three to four times the number in 1940.
Further, in 1942 the Secretary of War requested that the DOL
provide an exemption to the eighteen-year-old minimum age limit for
322
Work accidents
hazardous occupations, which the DOL granted.
323
involving children rose 100% from 1942 to 1943. The Increase both
to the rise in the number of children employed and to the sharp increase
324
Presaging modem trends,
in children employed in hazardous jobs.
the type of work performed by young people during the war shifted
from primarily agriculture to a balance between farming,
325
manufacturing, and services_.
The weaknesses of the child labor provisions of the FLSA were
•

318.

Bureau of Lab. Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Lab., Sources of Labor Supply for the
War, 57 Mthly~ L. Rpt. 212, 212-213 (1943).
319. Id. at 212.
320.
Natsuki Aruga, HAn' Finish School": Child Labor During World War II, 29
Lab. History 498 (1988) (school enrollment for fifteen- to eighteen-year-olds fell by
1.2 million, and employment of fourteen- to seventeen-year-olds increased by over two
million).
321. Bureau of Lab. Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Lab., Teen-Age Youth in the Wartime
Labor Force, 60 Mthly L. Rpt. 6, 8 (1945) [hereinafter Teen-Age Youth in Wartime
Labor]. Nationally, youth not attending school worked an average of forty-six hours
per week. /d. at 15.
322.
Aruga, supra n. 320, at 519.
323.
See id. at 498.
324. See id. at 512.
325. Teen-Age Youth in Wartime Labor, supra n. 321, at 11. In April 1944, six
times as many workers between the ages of fourteen and seventeen worked in
manufacturing, and over seven times more worked in service jobs than in 1940. Aruga,
supra n. 320, at 509.
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apparent from the outset. Some deficiencies were, and are, apparent
from the face of the statute itself, e.g., exclusions from coverage,
allowance of work by most fourteen- to eighteen-year-olds, and lack of
effective administrative resources or remedies for injured working
326
youth~
The safety and health issues were particularly egregious.
Previous decades had produced a lengthy and richly documented
327
These
history of death, injury, and disease produced by child labor.
issues were fully discussed at the FLSA committee hearings, but the
statute did not mandate any reporting of work-related injuries and
deaths, safety training for youth workers, or adult supervision. Other
problems, such as lack of administrative enforcement, only became
evident later.
Despite its symbolic importance, the FLSA's actual effect upon
child labor in the United States was slight. Contemporary writers
estimated only 30-50,000 youth workers under sixteen were covered
328
In
out of a total of 850,000 non-farm children then employed.
addition, 1930 Census data indicated one-half million worked on
329
Historian Jeremy
farms; these were entirely excluded from the Act.
Felt estimated only 25% of youth in non-agricultural occupations and
only 6% of the total number of under-sixteen-year-old workers were
33
affected by the passage of FLSA.
Children in industrial agriculture,
intrastate industries, the street trades, messenger and delivery service,
stores, hotels, restaurants, beauty parlors, bowling alleys, filling
331
Even worse, the
stations, garages, et cetera, were outside the law.
law did not apply to many sectors of the economy where the most·.
332
dramatic abuses of child labor were concentrated.

°

See infra nn. 344-345 and accompanying text (no private right of action under
the FLSA for children injured while working in violation of federal law).
327. See supra nn. 99-103 and accompanying text (congressional study of female
and child labor produced nineteen volumes of reports and data on the problems
produced by employment of theses groups).
328.
Katharine Du Pre Lumpkin, The Child wbor Provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 6(3) L. & Contemp. Probs. 391, 405 (1939). The Act did" ... not begin
to deal with child labor as a mass problem. It touches at best 6 percent of these
younger employed children." /d.
329. See infra nn. 351-352 and accompanying text.
330.
Felt, supra n. 28, at 477-478.
331.
See Du Pre Lumpkin, supra n. 328, at 402-403; Jonathan Grossman, Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage, 101 Mthly
Lab. Rev. 22, 29 ( 1978).
332.
See Du Pre Lumpkin, supra n. 328, at 402-403.
326.
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In this regard, the FLSA followed the pattern of previous federal
child labor restrictions, which likewise had little practical impact. The
1916 Keating-Owen Act had excluded most ·workplaces where youth
333
workers were concentrated
and there had. been little enforcement
334
against employers.
The NRA Codes in the Great Depression
applied princi~ally .to. specified in~ustrial faciliti~s. where youth were
3
often absent. ~ Stmtlarly, the chtld labor provtstons of the Walsh336
337
Healey Public Contracts Act of 1937 and Sugar Act of 1937 were
directed at relatively small pockets of child labor.
Aside from exclusions from coverage, the FLSA failed to
effectually control child labor between the ages of fourteen and
338
eighteen. The Act bans "oppressive child labor,"
but the definition
varies with the age of the child, the industry,- the type of job, parental
involvement, schooling and other factors. While sixteen is the usual
·minimum age for emplo~ment, the Act lowers the minimum age to
339
fourteen in many cases.
The FLSA provided no authority to
regulate the number of hours or the time sixteen- and seventeen-year340
olds could work.
These adolescents may be compelled to work long
hours and late into the night, conditions almost certain to impair their
studies. When all these exemptions are tallied, millions of American
341
children are working legally today.
Lack of meaningful remedies was another significant deficiency .

See supra nn~ 104-llO and accompanying_text.
334.
See supra nn. J04-11 0; Katharine Du Pre Lumpkin & Dorothy Wolff
Douglas, Child Workers in America 61 (Robert M. McBride & Co. 1937).
335.
See Felt, supra n. 28, at 473.
336. 4 I U.S.C.S. § 35 (20 10).
337.
Pub. L. No. 75-414, § 30 I, 50 Stat. 903, 909 ( 1937).
338. 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 203, 212 (20 10); see 29 C.P.R. § 570.102 (20 10).
339. 29 C.P.R. § 570(a)( I)(i) (" ... employment is confined to periods which will
333.

not interfere with their schooling and to conditions which will not interfere with their
health). The Regulation restricts youth between fourteen and fifteen years of age to no
more than three hours of work per day and eighteen hours of work per week when
school is in session. 29 C.F.R. at § 570.35. However, many youth work far more
hours.
340. See Schmidt v. Reich, 835 F.Supp. 435, 444 (N.D. IlL 1993).
341.
Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Young Workers Safety and Health,
Selected Charts on Young Worker Employment, Injuries and Illnesses, Figure 2,
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/youth/chtpkgfig2.html (accessed Feb. 7, 2011). In
2007, there were 2.6 million employed youth between fifteen and seventeen years of

age. /d.
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Primary reliance was placed on criminal sanctions, but not one
342
The combination of a heightened
prosecution was ever brought.
mental requirement, need for a repeat offense, and the minimal
343
The Act's
sanction quickly rendered criminal enforcement useless.
civil sanctions were similarly toothless. No civil penalties were
included for violations. Individuals and the agency were given the
344
right to pursue claims for unpaid minimum wage or overtime,
but
only the DOL may enforce the safety and health provisions of the
FLSA. Enforcement by the parties most likely to bring suit an
345
injured youth and their families is thus unavailable.
Moreover, administrative enforcement of the child labor
provisions was almost non-existent from the beginning. Only $50,000
was appropriated for the Children's Bureau in 1939 to enforce the child
346
The Wage and Hour Division, given jurisdiction
labor provisions.
to administer the general wage and hour provisions, had twenty-three
inspectors in 1939, despite the fact that 603 were estimated to be
347
Given a workforce of approximately one million children,
needed.
and the agency's responsibility for adult conditions of employment, it
was apparent from the outset that there would be little or no

342. Ran LEXIS tenns and connectors search of the following: "29 pre/5 216a"
retrieving sixteen results, none of which dealt specifically with child labor law
violations (last search Sept. 12, 2008).
343.
Darby v. U.S., 132 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1943) (conviction requires
~'deliberate, voluntary and intentional" conduct, or actions with reckless indifference to,
or disregard for, the Act's requirements). uWillfulness is deliberate and purposeful
failure to comply with Fair Labor Standards Act." /d. Violation is willful if act of
"defendant is deliberate, voluntary, and intentional"; mere mistakes or inadvertency is
insufficient to show willfulness. Nabob Oil Co. v. U.S., 190 F.2d 478, 480 (lOth Cir.
1951 ). "Violation is willful only if employer knew or showed reckless disregard as to
whether its conduct was prohibited." Brock v. Richland Shoe, 779 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir.
1986).
344. 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 216(b)(2010), 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 216(c)(2010) (provides
employees with a cause of action for back wages, liquidated damages, attorney's fees,
and litigation costs). § 216(b) provides for a jury trial. Loriliard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
580 ( 1978). Liquidated damages are calculated by doubling the amount of unpaid
minimum wages or overtime awarded to the plaintiff. See e.g. Coston v. Plitt Theaters,
831 F.2d 1321, 1328-1330 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 ( 1988) (ADEA
case following FLSA precedent).
345.
See e.g. Henderson v. Bear, 968 P.2d 144, 146 (Colo. App. 1998) (finding
FLSA violations provide no basis for implying private cause of action).
346.
Paulsen, supra n. 289, at 135.
347.
/d.
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enforcement. And after a year of operation, the Children's Bureau had

managed to .hold just ?~e heari~g on t~e need for the promu)1ation ~f
48

Hazardous Orders, crtttcal for tmprovtng health and safety.
Thts
administrative lethargy proved to be a harbinger of the future lack of
enforcement.
E.

The Agricultural Exclusion

One of the most important exclusions from coverage by the
FLSA .that of agricultural workers reflected structural factors in
American public life that go to the heart of efforts to produce social
change in any period. The FLSA' s treatment of farm workers reflected
the complicated and interwoven effect of ideology, economic and
349
The
political power, and our own "American Dilemma" race.
administration's 1937 proposed bill excluded agriculture and
contained, in the sponsor's own words, "the most comprehensive
350
definition of agriculture ever formulated~ "

348. DuPre Lumpkin, supra n. 328, at 396-397. The only hearing concerned the
explosives industry.
349. See generally Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem
and American Democracy 809 (Harper & Row 1944). Myrdal' s study of race relations
in America detailed the obstacles to full participation in American society of AfricanAmericans. ld. The "dilemma" of the title referred to the coexistence of American
liberal ideals and the denial of civil, economic, and political rights to AfricanAmericans. /d. at 794. The "negro problem" was ultimately a white man's problem. /d.
at 587.
350. 81 Cong. Rec. 7648 ( 1937) (statement of Senator Black, Chief Senate sponsor
·o f the FLSA). Section 3(f) of the FLSA contained the following definition of
agriculture:
"Agriculture" includes farn1ing in all its branches and among other things
includes the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying 1 the production,
cultivation, growing and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural
commodities (including commodities defined as agricultural commodities in
section 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, as amended), the raising of
livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals, or poultry, and any practices (including
any forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a fann as
an incident to or in conjunction with such fanning operations, including
prepara:tion for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for
transportation to market
Pub. L. No~ 75-718, § J(f), 80 Stat 833, 833-834 (codified as-amended at 29
U.S.C. § 203(t) ( 1982)). This broad exclusion included any "practice incident

to farming.'' /d.
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Congress was fully aware that by 1930 agriculture was "the most
351
employing 61% of
serious child labor problem in the United States,"
all child workers ten- to sixteen-years old, and 87% of children aged
352
ten to fourteen.
At the time of the initial passage of the FLSA in
1938, farm laborers adult and youth were among the poorest
353
Their exclusion
workers in the country and they remain so today.
from the FLSA is explained at one level by simple political reality.
Two key voting blocs farm state and southern Congressmen would
have torpedoed any labor reform measure that included workers in
354
As Representative Hartley commented:
those sectors.
Political expedience rather than relief for the exploited
workers of America has dictated the terms of this
bill ... [W]hy is it that the poorest paid labor of all, the farm
labor ... has been omitted from this bill? The answer is that
the votes of the farm block in the House, the best organized

351.
Davin Curtiss, The Fair Labor Standards Act and Child Labor in Agriculture,
20 J. of Corp. L. 303,309 (1994-1995).
/d.
352.
353.
A U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Study showed that the annual average wage for
farm workers between 1935-1939 was $410 without board and $312 with board at that
time. This sum was approximately one-half of the minimum wage of $806 per year set
by the FLSA. According to the most recent National Agricultural Workers Survey
(NA WS), the 2000-2001 median family income for farm workers (including income
from a11 sources, not just fann work) was in the range of $15,000-$17,499 per year, or
$288-$337 in gross wages per week. Thirty percent of all fann workers, according to
Dept. of Lab., A
NA WS, had total family incomes below the poverty line.
Demographic and Employment Profile of United States Farm Workers, Findings from
the National Agricultural Workers Survey 2001-2002 xi,
http://www .doleta.gov/agworker/report9/naws_rpt9.pdf (March 2005).
354.
83 Cong. Rec. 9257 ( 1938). Historian Carey McWilliams noted that fann
workers were historically excluded from political centers of power and that
[m]ost of our social legislation has been enacted as the result of a political
'deal' between organized labor and farm groups. The basis of this deal has
always been 'we the far rn representatives' will not object to this legislation,
if you, the representatives of organized labor, will agree to exempt farm
employees.
Carey McWilliams, Farm Workers and "Dirt Farmers" Need Power, in New Deal
Thought 251, 254-255 (H. Zinn ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1965). In addition,
Southerners dominated Congress and controlled key committees essential to enactment
of President Roosevelt's progressive statutes. They were intent on protecting the
existing Jim Crow economy in the South and its attendant white supremacist ideology.
Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination
in the New Deal, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1335, 1351 ( 1987).
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block we have
355
defeated it.

here~

would have voted against the bill and

The exclusion of agricultural workers was also a reflection of the
power wielded by large agricultural interests in Congress and state
legislatures.
Lobbyists from The Grange, The Farm Bureau
Federation, and other organizations representing big agribusiness were
ubiquitously present duri,hearings and _oth~r legislative processes in
6
3
the passage of the FLSA.
These organtzattons argued farmers could
not afford to pay minimum wages or comply with safety regulation.
Such requirements "would make it virtually impossible for the farmer
357
to secure hired help within his reach."
Abandonment of agricultural workers, inc.luding children, in the
FLSA was part of a larger legislative pattern excluding them from
358
numerous other protective statutes.
A number of factors combined
to produce this result. Ideology was at work; from the founding of the
Republic, work on farms was idealized as healthful, educational, and
359
In 1910, in proposing a
an example of the uniquely American spirit.
bill to limit child labor, Senator Albert Beverage noted that his intent
was not to "strike at the employment of children engaged in
agriculture. I do not pretend that working children on the farm is bad
360
for them.;,
State child labor statutes passed during the Progressive
361
Era routinely excluded farm work.
Indeed, as the anti-child labor
355. 83 Cong. Rec. 9257 ( 1938).
356. Curtiss, supra n. 351, at 305; see Patrick M. Anderson, The Agricultural
Employee Exemption from the Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938, 12 Hamline L. Rev
649, 656 ( 1989).
357. ,82 Cong. Rec. 1477 (1937).
358-. The Keating-Owen Act did not cover farm labor and the National Labor
Relations Act likewise excluded agricultural 1abor from its protection of union
organization and collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C.S. 142(3) (2010). For a detailed
description of the exclusion of agricultural laborers from the FLSA, reference
Anderson, supra n. 356.
359. Trattner, supra n. 84, at 149. In 1785, Thomas Jefferson declared that
"[c]ultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous,
the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their country and wedded
to its liberty and interests by the most lasting bonds." The Jefferson Monticello,
Jefferson, Quotations on Agriculture,
http://www. monticello.org/si te/jeffersonlquotations-agriculture (accessed Feb. 7,
2011).
360. Trattner,. supra n. 84, at 149.
361. See e.g. N.Y. Labor L. § 130 (1923) ("no child under 14 years of age shall be
employed in ... any factory, mercantile establishment, business office ... or in the

2010]

AMERICAN CHILD LABOR LAW BECAME A CON GAME

151

movement in the cities strengthened, more youths seem to have
362
become employed in agriculture.
But more was at work than the importance of cheap labor and the
Myth of the American Farmer. Race was, and continues to be, a
decisive factor. In many areas of the country, particularly in the South,
African-Americans were concentrated in agricultural labor and
domestic work, sectors explicitly left out of New Deal legislation.
Black share-croppers were an important source of southern farm
363
production;
providing minimum wage coverage to them and to black
domestic workers would have upset the existing Jim Crow socioeconomic hierarchy in these states. "[T]he primary ... beneficiaries of
the exclusion were the large agricultural employers of the South (and
of California) who depended upon a cheap supply of minority labor,
364
Blacks
much as they had depended upon slave labor before 1865."
365
reflecting the political and
worked in conditions of near peonage,
legal hierarchy.
Bourbon aristocracy had resumed power in the southern states
after their agreement to back Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican
candidate in the disputed 1876 presidential race. They now ruled the
political~economic-social life of the former Confederacy and had
succeeded in almost completely disenfranchising and subordinating
African-Americans, often the majority of the population in many
political units. Southern states had rewritten their constitutions to deny
366
Post-Civil
blacks and often poor whites as well the right to vote.
War Amendments and statutes notwithstanding, the High Court had

distribution or transmission of merchandise, articles or messages, or in the sale of
articles"); Trattner, supra n. 84, at 148-149.
362. See Trattner, supra n. 84, at 153; DuPre Lumpkin & Wolff Douglas, supra n.
334, at 61 (more than 500,000 youths were working in agriculture in 1930).
363. White planters preferred black to white sharecroppers because they could get
more work out of the blacks for less pay. Representatives in Congress blocked any
effort to change the Jim Crow status quo. Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil
Rights 7 (Harvard U. Press 2007).
364.
Linder, supra n. 354, at 1337-1338.
365.
Aside from the existing exploitative rural sharecropper system, AfricanAmericans from all over the country were enticed during the 1930's by the federal
government's United States Employment Service to Southern farm jobs, such as those
offered by the huge United States Sugar Company where they worked under conditions
of virtual slavery. Goluboff, supra n. 363, at 7-8, 139-140.
366. John Hope Franklin & Alfred A. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom, A
History ofAfrican Americans 286 ( 1947).
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placed its imprimatur on southern white supremacy in cases
interpreting federal
civil rights laws and
state-sponsored
367
segregation.
The disenfranchis_e ment of blacks was legitimated in
368
1903 by Giles v. Harris,
when the Supreme Court dismissed a suit
on behalf of 5,000 black citizens of Alabama purged from the voting
rolls as a result of the imposition of the various clauses of the new
369
Alabama Constitution.
In a shocking abdication of judicial power,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' majority opinion argued that federal
equity had no power to require local officials to allow the black
370
plaintiffs to register.
As a result of Giles and s_u bsequent cases involving the same
371
plaintiffs,
literacy tests, property and poll tax requirements,
"grandfather" clauses, and similar techniques were used for decades to
372
disenfranchise African-Americans throughout the South.
Indeed, it
313
was not until Smith v. Allwright,
more than forty years after Giles,
that the Supreme Court got around to deciding that the rules of the
Democratic Party of Texas excluding African-Americans from
participating in the party primary, the only significant election in most
374
southern states, was a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
The disenfranchisement of southern blacks had a direct effect on
the provisions of federal statutes such as the FLSA. As political
science Professor V.O. Key, Jr. explained in his classic 1949 work,

Southern Politics:

315

367.
See e.g. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-552 (1896) (upholding state
and local white supremacist laws); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 61-62 (1883)
(holding unconstitutional the 1875 Civil Rights Act).
368.
See 189 U.S. 475, 486-493 (I 903).
369.
The Alabama constitutional provisions used to exclude black voters included
the "good character and understand" clause. /d. at 483.
370.
Rather, legislative relief was necessary because simply registering blacks
under a flawed system would not cure the a11eged fraud.- /d. at 487-488.
371.
See Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 162. . 163 (1904) (suit seeking damages for
refusal to register black voters dismissed).
372.
Franklin & Moss, supra n. 366, at 283.
373.
321 u.s. 649 (1944).
374.
/d. at 663-664; see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 494 (1953) (holding that a
private political organization called the Jaybird Democratic Party could not exc1ude
blacks from its primaries on racial grounds).
375.
Robert K. Fleck, Democratic Opposition to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 62 J. of Ecort History 25, 27 (2002) (citing V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics 528
(1949)).
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[T]he stout defense by southern Congressman of child labor,
in an earlier day, and, more recently, of regional wage
differentials with southern workers on the short end,
illustrates the indifference of southern politicians toward
376
their non-voting laboring constituents.
Southern congressmen from districts with high numbers of non-voting
African-Americans opposed the FLSA, joining with conservative
~epublicans to block passage for almost a year and then voting against
3 7
tt. "7 The battle over the FLSA marked the end of the New Deal and
the beginning of a new Southern Dixiecrat-Republican coalition that
would rule Congress for decades.
Today, the correlation between race and farm work remains.
Nationally, approximately 85% of current farm workers, including
children, are members_of racial minorities. Today these workers are
37
The qu1d pro quo patd
Cahfornta, 99% of farm workers are Latino.
for congressional passage of the FLSA was a heavy price indeed. The
cost is felt to this day.
V .CONCLUSION

From the founding of the American colonies until the present day,
child labor has remained a constant feature of our United States
economy. This fact has been ratified by political/legal choices made
for hundreds of years. The most visible decisions about child labor
were made by conservative federal courts, particularly the Supreme
Court
Although there have long been legislative attempts to

376.
/d. at 27.
377.
Only 44% of Southern Democratic senators voted in favor of the FLSA, in
contrast with overwhelming support among Democratic senators from the rest of the
country. On the vote to pass the House version of the FLSA, a solid majority, fortynine to thirty-seven, of Southern Democratic Representatives, voted against the bill.
Democratic congresspersons from other regions were almost unanimous in support,
one hundred ninety-four to three. /d. at 32. Even the statutory exemption for
agriculture was not enough to bring these southern congressmen to support the FLSA.
378.
Dept.. of Lab., A Demographic and Entployment Profile of U.S. Farm Workers
48-49, http://www .doleta.gov/agworker/report9/naws_rpt9.pdf (Match 2005).
379.
See Child Lab. Coalition, Children in the Fields Campaign Fact Sheet,
http://www.stopchildlabor.org/Consumercampaigns/fields.htm (accessed Feb. 7, 2011)
(an increasing number of immigrant children traveling to the United States and finding
many migrant farm communities to be almost 99% Latino).
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ameliorate or end this employment, all have foundered in the face of
fierce opposition by employers and others. The ineffectiveness of the
FLSA of 1938, supposedly the death knell for child labor, is a result of
cleverly drafted exemptions and long-term administrative nonenforcement. The FLSA reflects the complicated and interwoven
effect of ideology, economic and political power, and our own
"American Dilemma" race.
The types of jobs youth currently hold are different from those in
previous generations. Most of our ~outh workforce is concentrated in
3 0
entry-level, age-segregated jobs
with few opportunities for
meaningful interaction with adults, skill acquisition or long-term
381
employment. These are simply not career opportunities.
This type
of work during adolescence provides few benefits and can jeopardize a
successful transition to adulthood.
The big winners from this state of affairs are employers able to
hire cheap, unskilled workers, and the sellers of goods and services
consumed by this large pool of adolescent buyers. The losers include
working youth and society as a whole. While work presents potential
benefits, it also poses substantial immediate and long-term risksacademic, health and social for adolescents and their families. In
essence, we are trading the future welfare of children and their families
for immediate, short-term gratification. This is an extraordinarily poor
trade-off.
I do not believe that all youth must attend school until the age of
eighteen. For many, true job training, vocational education and other
paths are better suited to their short- and long-terrn needs. But current
child labor reflects little advantage for them and should be radically
restructured. Many Americans have enlisted in the worthy crusade to
remedy the scandalous abuses of child labor in undeveloped Third
World countries. This is praiseworthy, but we should pay equal
attention to the problems of child labor here at home.

380.
381.

See Greenberger & Steinberg, supra n. 12, at 51.
See id. at 57.

